Russia Invades Ukraine. Again by captaincrunch

REAL WORLD EVENT DISCUSSIONS

Russia Invades Ukraine. Again

POSTED BY: CAPTAINCRUNCH
UPDATED: Sunday, July 26, 2026 06:30
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PAGE 217 of 217

Friday, July 24, 2026 3:37 PM

THG

Is also JJ. Keep it real please, and use a VPN

I'm sure you agree, aye comrade?

T

When Crimea falls to Ukraine, Putin is going to have a huge problem | Ben Hodges

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Friday, July 24, 2026 5:30 PM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Got a timeline for that prediction, Ben?

Of course not!

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Friday, July 24, 2026 6:10 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

How Cutting Off Crimea and Southern Ukraine Is Breaking Russia's Offensive Momentum

By Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv | 24.07.2026 20:00

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4147711-how-cutting-off-crimea-an
d-southern-ukraine-is-breaking-russias-offensive-momentum.html

How Cutting Off Crimea and Southern Ukraine Is Breaking Russia's Offensive Momentum

Destroyed Bridges, a Paralyzed Sea, Fuel Shortages, and Broken Supply Lines: At Last, It's Paying Off.

Analyzing the Situation on the Southern Front

The summer of 2026 on the southern theater of operations has been marked by the systematic attrition of Russian forces. In early June, Ukraine's Defense Forces launched a large-scale campaign officially dubbed "Logistics Lockdown." Rather than relying on costly frontal assaults against heavily fortified positions, the operation aims to methodically and surgically sever the Russian military's logistical lifelines—roads, bridges, railway junctions, and maritime supply routes across the Azov and Black seas.

By mid-July, the campaign had reached an unprecedented scale. During June alone, Ukrainian forces conducted precision strikes on 15 bridges—eight railway bridges and seven road bridges. The attacks spanned virtually the entire occupied south: from Ichky, Rozdolne, Vladyslavivka, and Voinka in Crimea to bridges over the Korsak River in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; from the Henichesk Strait and Chonhar crossings in Kherson Oblast to bridges over the Luhanchyk and Aidar rivers in the east. In July, additional targets included bridges in Donetsk Oblast near Huselnykove and Staromariivka, the railway bridge across the Syvash, and other critical infrastructure near Prymorsk.

Equally significant is the operation bearing the ironic—but devastating for the enemy—codename "MoLoCHKa" ("Moscow Will Fall Through Crimea"), launched on July 6. During its first 15 days alone, Ukrainian forces struck 183 vessels belonging to Russia's shadow fleet in the Azov and Black seas.

These efforts have been complemented by long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, electronics manufacturing facilities, chemical plants, heavy weapons factories, ammunition depots, and other strategic military-industrial targets deep inside Russia. Taken together, they form a comprehensive campaign aimed at isolating and systematically degrading the enemy's ability to wage war.

How has this unprecedented blockade already reshaped the battlefield in southern Ukraine? Ukrinform examines the situation together with leading military experts.

THE DOMINO EFFECT: HOW ATTACKS ON LOGISTICS ARE PARALYZING THE FRONT

The campaign's most significant achievement on land has been the effective disruption of the M-14 highway—the principal logistical artery connecting Mariupol with the occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. For years, this route served as the backbone of Russian military logistics, sustaining occupation forces on the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson axes while also supplying occupied Crimea.

Its degraded transport capacity has triggered a cascade of tactical setbacks for Russian forces, undermining their ability to sustain offensive operations, rotate personnel, and reinforce frontline units.

According to military expert Dmytro Sniehyrov, the blockade has already translated into tangible territorial gains for Ukraine's Defense Forces. Ukrainian units launched a successful counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, pushing Russian troops back around Maliivka, Sichneve, Novoheorhiivka, and Zaporizke, and re-establishing fire control over more than 33 square kilometers of territory. In neighboring Kherson Oblast, Ukrainian forces continue to hold the commanding heights on the west bank of the Dnipro River, while any attempts by Russian troops to establish positions on the islands in the Dnipro Delta are swiftly neutralized by artillery and swarms of FPV drones.

Perhaps the clearest indicator of the success of the "Logistics Lockdown" campaign is the steady decline in the enemy's firepower. According to Sniehyrov, logistical shortages have forced Russian forces to impose strict limits on their artillery expenditure.

"Disruptions to supplies from Crimea to the southern front have already reduced the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery fire from 2.4:1 to 1.6:1," Sniehyrov said.

This assessment is echoed by Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst with the Information Resistance group. Assessing the southern operational zone, he argues that the Russian offensive stretching from Stepnohirsk, through the Orikhiv axis, to the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts has effectively ground to a halt. Moreover, units of Russia's 58th Combined Arms Army are not only failing to advance but are increasingly struggling to hold their positions.

"Even Russian Z-war correspondents are openly acknowledging this. They complain that their units south of Stepnohirsk risk being encircled. They also acknowledge that, sooner or later, they will likely be forced to abandon Kamianske, as it will become increasingly difficult to defend. This is another consequence of the logistics lockdown. Russian troops are no longer receiving sufficient ammunition, equipment, or supplies. They are experiencing difficulties rotating personnel and deploying reinforcements. Even the delivery of drinking water has become problematic, which, particularly during the summer, is a critical issue," Kovalenko said.

He added that the Orikhiv axis has effectively fallen into operational stagnation.

"It is fair to say that Russia's plans to resume offensive operations there have failed completely. As for the Huliaipole axis, fighting remains relatively active only along a narrow, roughly 15-kilometer stretch between Huliaipole and Huliaipilske," the analyst noted.

Elsewhere, the situation is proving no easier for Russian forces.

"They are having trouble not only advancing but even holding their current positions. We recently saw troops from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment 'Skala' expand their zone of control. This was not a publicity stunt—it was a genuine battlefield success. In fact, Russian sources themselves had been complaining for weeks that Ukrainian forces were exerting heavy pressure in that sector. The first reports confirming the Defense Forces' advance actually appeared on Russian channels. For understandable operational security reasons, Ukraine's official institutions do not release such information immediately," the expert explained.

"Moreover, official battlefield maps, including those produced by DeepState, do not fully reflect the gains made by Ukrainian forces, which are now operating well beyond the publicly indicated lines of control. That is why I believe we are likely to see further gains in the coming weeks. All of this stems from Russia's steadily diminishing ability to properly sustain its forces in both offensive and defensive operations."

A similar dynamic is unfolding within Russia's Dnipro Group of Forces in Kherson Oblast.

"Overall, the occupied part of Kherson Oblast is becoming even more isolated than the Crimean Peninsula itself. In fact, the situation there is considerably more critical for the enemy. It is already evident that our comprehensive effort to isolate the southern operational zone is producing tangible results. Russia is being exhausted not only militarily but economically as well," Oleksandr Kovalenko argues.

According to Kovalenko, Russia is now forced to devote the lion's share of its resources simply to keeping its logistics network operational as Ukrainian forces continue to systematically dismantle it. The disruption of maritime cargo traffic across the Sea of Azov—to Crimea, Berdiansk, and Mariupol—combined with Ukraine's growing pressure in the Black Sea, is steadily eroding Russia's ability to sustain its southern grouping of forces, creating what Kovalenko describes as increasingly catastrophic conditions.

"Of course, I would not rush to say that a decisive turning point in our favor is imminent. But there is no doubt that the southern operational zone is where Russian forces currently find themselves in their most difficult position," the Information Resistance analyst said.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE AUTUMN RUBICON: WHAT COMES NEXT?

The undeniable successes of the summer campaign raise an obvious question for Ukraine's military leadership and society alike: What comes next? Will this logistical paralysis ultimately translate into the collapse of Russia's southern front? And how long will this favorable window of opportunity remain open?

The experts agree that Ukraine has entered a critical phase that is likely to shape the course of the war throughout 2026 and 2027. Kovalenko believes this so-called "window of opportunity" has already opened, but it will not remain open indefinitely. In his assessment, it will last only two to two and a half months—through the end of September. During that period, the priority must be to consolidate gains on mainland Ukraine, since without them any future operation to liberate Crimea would have little prospect of success.

The principal challenge looming on the autumn horizon lies not on the battlefield but in Russia's domestic political calendar. Once the September 2026 State Duma elections conclude, the Kremlin will have greater political freedom to make unpopular decisions.

"Everything will depend on the objectives the Kremlin ultimately sets for itself. If its goal is to hold the Ukrainian territories it already occupies while continuing its slow, incremental offensive, it will need to mobilize approximately 500,000 personnel. That would mean Ukraine would likely have to spend another year to a year and a half fighting primarily in a defensive, attritional campaign. That is the most unfavorable scenario," Kovalenko predicts.

Kovalenko also does not rule out a more ambitious scenario in which Moscow seeks to mobilize up to one million personnel to open a new axis of attack. Although such an undertaking would require considerably more time, he considers it the most serious long-term threat. For that reason, he argues, the Defense Forces' priority during August and September should be to inflict maximum losses while improving their tactical positions to such an extent that any future wave of Russian mobilized troops would be blunted against well-prepared Ukrainian defenses before it could be fully brought to bear.

Even so, there are serious doubts about Russia's ability to absorb, train, equip, and sustain such a force. Israeli military commentator Sergei Auslender argues that reports circulating within Russia's Z-community about the mobilization of 1.2 million people are a classic information operation. Their purpose, he says, is to gauge public sentiment and test society's willingness to accept another large-scale mobilization.

"Russia's mobilization system is unlikely to be capable of simultaneously absorbing and equipping even several hundred thousand personnel, let alone more than a million. The Russian authorities clearly remember the consequences of the 2022 mobilization and understand that another large-scale draft could trigger significant internal migration, widespread draft evasion, and a marked increase in social tensions," Auslender said.

Even if Russia could theoretically assemble such a force, another question remains: how would it fuel and sustain it while Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to erode the country's industrial and energy base? Auslender points to the recent attacks on the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat complex in Bashkortostan—which accounted for roughly 5% of Russia's petroleum product output—and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, a facility critical to supplying Russia's southern grouping of forces. Even if the war were to end today, he argues, restoring this infrastructure would take years.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine's strategy for the coming months appears increasingly well defined. It rests on the combined effect of several parallel efforts: maintaining the blockade of the Azov and Black seas, systematically dismantling Russia's logistics network, and conducting long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russia.

"If, during this period, we can improve our battlefield positions to the point where they substantially reduce the future impact of a Russian mobilization, we will enter late 2026 and early 2027 from a much stronger position. If, however, this trend reverses, then this 'window of opportunity' will undoubtedly begin to close much sooner," Kovalenko concluded, stressing the critical importance of maintaining the current operational tempo.

The "Logistics Lockdown" campaign and the blockade of the Azov and Black seas have transformed the southern theater into a zone of growing logistical and resource shortages for Russian occupation forces. The decline in Russia's offensive potential and the loss of its operational initiative in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts are a direct result of Ukraine's precision campaign against bridges, oil refineries, critical logistics infrastructure, and the shadow fleet.

The coming two to three months are likely to prove decisive. If Ukraine can maintain the current pace of isolating the southern theater before any potential autumn mobilization in Russia, it will be well positioned to shape the strategic balance in the 2027 campaign, potentially turning Russia's mounting logistical crisis into a far broader operational collapse.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Friday, July 24, 2026 7:06 PM

THG

Is also JJ. Keep it real please, and use a VPN

Quote:
Originally posted by SIGNYM:
Got a timeline for that prediction, Ben?

Of course not!

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

The plan isn’t to storm the peninsula. It’s to make staying impossible. Even Russian officers now call Crimea a front-line region.

T

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Friday, July 24, 2026 7:38 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

How volunteers with 3D printers make weapons for Ukraine

Jul 24, 2026

Last week, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy dismissed his tech-savvy defense minister. That sparked protests among supporters who credit him with helping transform Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Special correspondent Simon Ostrovsky and producer Katia Patin report on the technologies and policies that helped drive that transformation. A warning: this story includes graphic descriptions of war.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 7:41 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Russian tanks obliterated near Pankivka as new anti-drone system fails. The Russians’ new Arena-M systems shoots tiny projectiles at incoming enemy drones. But it didn’t save a Russian tank assault this week.

When the smoke and dust cleared, the Russians had lost at least 9 tanks.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/24/t-72b3a/

Without so-called "active defenses" that can shoot down incoming drones, "it is currently very easy to throw a tank battalion into [an] assault and lose it all without achieving anything," analyst Jakub Janovsky explained. The Arena-M is Russia's answer. It uses a Doppler radar to spot incoming rockets, missiles, and drones, and 12 launchers ringed around the turret fire tiny charges meant to shred the threat a few meters out.

Russian industry has been calling the Arena-M the first system in the world able to protect armor from FPV drones and loitering munitions. Israel's Rafael announced drone-interception upgrades to its Trophy system in January 2025.

What the shield actually did is contested, and the argument is worth following. One Russian armor specialist watching the video saw no reaction at all—countermeasures still sitting in their launchers, no attempt to engage. Observer Matt Drew, watching the same footage, read it the other way: a puff of smoke off the turret in the opening seconds, an explosion to the side, and several drone feeds that cut out before reaching the tank—which is what an interception looks like from the drone's camera. Only after the tanks were disabled and abandoned could the drones close in and linger, and it took bomber drones to finish the hulks. "Probably not the success the Russians were hoping for," Drew wrote, "but it definitely worked for a while."

A while is the problem. Twelve charges is a finite number and Ukrainian drone crews do not attack in twelves. A shield that intercepts the first drones and runs dry against the tenth turns a tank into a slower target, not a surviving one. And the latest push toward Kramatorsk failed.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 7:50 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Ukraine currently holds strategic initiative in war, says Austrian expert

25.07.2026 13:10

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4147859-ukraine-currently-holds-s
trategic-initiative-in-war-says-austrian-expert.html

Following a harsh winter, Ukraine has gained the strategic initiative in the war, successfully thwarting a large-scale Russian summer offensive and inflicting significant damage on Russia through operational and strategic strikes.

This view was expressed in an interview with Ukrinform by Colonel of the Austrian Armed Forces, Head of the Institute for Basic Officer Training at the Theresian Military Academy, Markus Reisner. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/4147697-markus-rajsner-avstrijskij
-vijskovij-ekspert.html

“In my opinion, Ukraine currently holds the strategic initiative. It emerged from a very difficult winter and was able to carry out preparatory measures in the spring to prevent the Russian summer offensive from unfolding,” Reisner noted.

According to him, Ukraine has so effectively thwarted the expected Russian summer offensive that Russian troops have been unable to make a large-scale advance. “Yes, they are carrying out isolated operations at the tactical level, but not in the form they had anticipated,” the expert noted.

Reisner also highlighted the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets. “In my opinion, we are also seeing for the first time that Putin can no longer deny it: Ukrainian strikes at the operational and, above all, strategic levels are inflicting enormous damage,” he emphasized.

According to the Austrian military expert, the effectiveness of the parties’ actions in the war should be assessed on the basis of concrete results.

“If Putin convenes a crisis meeting and claims there are problems with fuel supplies, that is a measurable result. It demonstrates the success of Ukrainian forces at the operational-strategic level,” Reisner emphasized.

He characterizes the current period as the tenth phase of the war, the start of which in May was marked by massive Ukrainian strikes using drones and cruise missiles against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

“The front line has stalled. Although the Russians are attacking, they cannot make any real progress. The Ukrainians are defending themselves, but they also cannot recapture territory on any significant scale,” the expert noted.

According to Reisner’s assessment, a new phase of the war could be triggered either by further escalation on Russia’s part or by a significant impact from Ukrainian strikes.

“On the other hand, a new phase could also be initiated by Ukraine—for example, if its strikes at the strategic or operational level have such a tangible effect that they force Russia to the negotiating table to discuss a ceasefire. That, too, could usher in a new phase,” he emphasized.

As reported by Ukrinform, Christopher Coates, former Deputy Commander of NORAD and Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, believes that in the war with Russia, Ukraine has managed to gain a technical advantage and seize the initiative.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 9:03 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Markus Reisner, Austrian military expert

Ukraine now has the strategic initiative in the war

Google translation from Ukrainian | 07/25/2026 09:00

https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/4147697-markus-rajsner-avstrijskij
-vijskovij-ekspert.html

Russia's war against Ukraine, according to Austrian military expert Markus Reisner, has entered its tenth phase and, to use his boxing metaphor, the tenth round of a grueling duel. The larger and formally stronger Russian opponent is trying to "clinch" Ukraine, impose a traditional war of attrition on it, and use its advantage in resources. Ukraine succeeds when it keeps its distance, acts unconventionally, and strikes where the enemy does not expect them.

For now, according to Reisner, the strategic initiative belongs to Ukraine. It managed to survive a difficult winter and thwart the deployment of a large-scale Russian summer offensive, while simultaneously intensifying attacks on Russian logistics, energy infrastructure and strategic depth. At the same time, missile defense remains its main vulnerability, and the coming months before winter could be decisive.

In an interview with Ukrinform, the head of the Theresienstadt Military Academy's Officer Training Institute, Colonel of the Austrian Armed Forces Markus Reisner, commented on the current phase of the war and the struggle for strategic initiative, the role of drones and long-range strikes, the prospects of the Russian offensive, and the conditions under which Moscow may be forced to agree to a ceasefire.

WE ARE IN THE TENTH PHASE OF THIS WAR

- Colonel, you analyze the Russian war against Ukraine through the prism of successive phases. In your opinion, which phase are we in now and what is its defining feature?

For the first time, we saw very specific threats from Russia against Europe.

- In my opinion, we are now in the 10th phase of this war. Its beginning was marked primarily by massive and powerful Ukrainian drone and cruise missile strikes on Russia's energy infrastructure. It began in May of this year and continues to this day, in the summer.

This is also the phase in which we first saw very specific Russian threats to Europe – Russia is threatening European companies involved in the Ukrainian long-range drone program. Furthermore, right now – back in May – we saw the US attempt to mediate to achieve some kind of ceasefire. However, this attempt has not yet been successful.

The front itself is frozen. The Russians, although attacking, cannot really advance. The Ukrainians are defending, but also cannot retake territory on any significant scale.

Further escalation is taking place at the operational-strategic level. The air war is increasingly moving the conflict to the strategic level, while Ukraine is attempting to attack Russian frontline logistics at the operational level.

In this phase, we again saw very specific Russian threats. For example, the test of the Sarmat nuclear missile on May 12, large-scale nuclear exercises, and the third use of the Oreshnik medium-range missile – also in May – as a message to Europe.

It is also interesting how actively the so-called Tech-Bros – the heads of leading American technology companies – support Ukraine. Palantir plays an important role thanks to the MAVEN and PRISMA systems. MAVEN helps Ukraine, using target data, to launch pinpoint strikes on Russia, and PRISMA allows for the most effective use of limited air defense capabilities. To this we can add Elon Musk with Starlink.

For this phase, in my opinion, it is also indicative that on July 5, Peskov publicly called the "special operation" a war for the first time. In the well-known Russian gradation of escalation levels, this is, in my opinion, another step - from a local war towards a so-called regional war.

The final culmination, if I may say so, was the dismissal of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense . In my opinion, he was one of the main drivers of innovative ideas and their implementation at the operational-strategic level, in particular regarding strikes with long-range drones. He also tried to reduce the losses of the Ukrainian armed forces so that new soldiers would not have to be sent to the front again and again, and instead unmanned systems would be used more widely.

There are various theories as to the reasons for this replacement. But only in the coming weeks and months will we see whether this will affect Ukraine's conduct of the war or not.

- What has to happen on the front, in the air war, or in international politics, for you to be able to talk about the beginning of a new phase?

- In my opinion, the beginning of a new phase would come when, for example, there would be a clear further escalation from Russia. Remember: in September, parliamentary elections will be held in Russia. Perhaps Putin is waiting for the end of these elections to then start a new wave of mobilization, as we have already seen in 2022. A new wave of mobilization would be accompanied by a further increase in the intensity of attacks and would mean escalation.

Another escalation option could be that Russia, as expected, will once again begin to inflict heavy blows on critical infrastructure as the fall and winter begin. This is one reason why Zelensky said that the task of the new government is to prepare Ukraine for winter, that is, to strengthen protective measures.

On the other hand, a new phase could also be initiated by Ukraine, for example, if its strikes at the strategic or operational level produce such a tangible effect that Russia is forced to sit down at the negotiating table to discuss a ceasefire. This could also start a new phase.

- Who now owns the strategic initiative?

- In my opinion, the strategic initiative now belongs to Ukraine. It came out of a very difficult winter and was able to carry out preparatory measures in the spring to prevent the Russian summer offensive from unfolding.

It was clear that Ukraine had so thwarted the expected Russian offensive in the summer that the Russians were unable to make a large-scale advance. Yes, they were doing it in a tactical way, but not in the form they had hoped for.

In my opinion, we are also seeing for the first time that Putin can no longer deny: Ukrainian strikes at the operational and, above all, strategic levels are causing enormous damage.

And this is the main thing that I constantly point out: no matter what either side does, the result must be measurable. If Putin calls an anti-crisis meeting and says that there are problems with fuel supplies, then this is a measurable result. It indicates the success of Ukrainian forces at the operational-strategic level.

UKRAINE ACHIEVES SUCCESS WHEN IT FIGHTS UNCONVENTIONALLY

- What, in your opinion, is the determining factor in the success of Ukrainian defense so far?

- I always compare this war to a boxing match. We are, in fact, in the tenth round. On one side is the supposedly stronger Russian opponent, who can be compared to boxer Mykola Valuev, and on the other is the agile Ukrainian underdog, similar to David Haye, who defeated Valuev.

Ukraine must not allow itself to be dragged into the traditional way of waging war

Ukraine succeeds whenever it fights unconventionally and acts in a way that the enemy does not expect. The Russians, on the other hand, succeed when they manage to force Ukraine to switch to traditional forms of fighting, such as a war of attrition.

In boxing, exhausted fighters often enter the clinch. This is advantageous for the larger boxer, who, by putting his weight on the smaller one, can rest a bit and gain new strength.

Ukraine must not allow itself to be drawn into this clinch – that is, into this traditional way of waging war. The diverse capabilities and methods of drone warfare allow it to operate at a distance. Ukraine has achieved success when, for example, it advanced to the Kursk region, conducted Operation Spiderweb, unexpectedly destroyed Russian logistics with HIMARS systems, or began to interrupt fuel supplies with Hornet drones – in cooperation with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.

It was at such moments that Ukraine was successful. In my opinion, the new Minister of Defense should continue this path. If he completely immerses himself again in the traditional way of waging war, this will not be enough.

ANOTHER 300,000 SOLDIERS WILL NOT HELP RUSSIA OVERCOME THE UKRAINIAN "WALL OF DRONES"

- What do you think is the actual operational goal of the Russian campaign this summer?

- The operational goal of the Russians is clear - they are trying to capture the "fortress-bridge" belt of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk and thus capture the main part of Donbas at the operational level.

At the strategic level, Russia's goal, as before, is to take Ukraine into a vice, that is, to enter a clinch, strategically exhaust it, and effectively bring it to collapse in a war of attrition.

- In your opinion, is Russia capable of achieving a decisive breakthrough with its current forces? And what will the further course of the war depend on?

- I think that simply bringing in additional soldiers will not be enough. The way war is waged has changed so much that the decisive difference is primarily the use of special weapons systems. Suffice it to mention drones.

At the tactical level, we have a stalemate, as both sides have created a "transparent battlefield." Due to the use of many tens of thousands of drones, it is almost impossible to overcome this battlefield. If Russia simply brought up another 300,000 troops, in my opinion, this would not be enough, because they would crash into the Ukrainian wall of drones.

Unless Russia will continue to deliberately take extremely high casualties and send soldiers forward until Ukraine runs out of drones. But I think even the Russian leadership understands that this will not bring sustainable success.

Now the Russians' task is to find those gaps that are Ukraine's "Achilles' heel." It was these weak spots that they needed to hit, so that later, using the mobilization momentum, they could make a breakthrough. But they have not yet discovered these weak spots and "Achilles' heels." They are looking for them, but they have not yet achieved a real breakthrough. There are various technological and tactical approaches, but there is no real success yet.

Ukraine knows it has until about fall to force Russia to cease fire

This may change. But everything may also remain as it is, and then Russia will lose the strategic initiative for a long time.

The decisive moment will be when Russia, due to Ukrainian strikes deep into the country, suffers such severe damage to its industrial complex that it becomes irreparable. If Russia is not successful at the front, it may still be forced to agree to a ceasefire, because otherwise the damage will be too long-lasting.

It is clear that both sides are trying to achieve a decisive result before winter. For now, this issue remains open.

Ukraine knows it has until the fall to force a ceasefire from Russia. Then the difficult winter phase will begin again, with expected heavy Russian strikes on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, which is still damaged or partially destroyed and suffered significant damage last winter.

Zelensky has repeatedly said that he is ready for at least a ceasefire at the strategic level, that is, an end to mutual strikes in depth. On the other hand, the Russians are also trying to achieve some result as soon as possible. They know that they are running out of time, because the intensity of Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory is constantly increasing. This escalation is about a struggle of wills and who is stronger.

In my opinion, the situation around Iran has a positive impact on this. The Americans see that despite air strikes, they are not achieving decisive success there and that Iran can continue to exert pressure through the Strait of Hormuz.

I think that's why Trump is focusing more on Ukraine again. He hopes to get a result here that he can use domestically and use before the midterm elections in Congress. The NATO summit also again sounded a noticeably more conciliatory tone towards Ukraine.

A MECHANIZED BREAKTHROUGH IS POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE "TRANSPARENT BATTLEFIELD"

- You mentioned the "transparent battlefield." Does this mean that a classic large-scale mechanized breakthrough in this war has become almost impossible? And what could be the answer to this "transparent battlefield"?

- Hundreds of military theorists and strategists are currently racking their brains over this. There are various explanatory models and approaches. I can only briefly and selectively outline a few trends.

In general, it is not excluded that in the future mechanized operations by large formations will again be possible - provided that the "transparent battlefield" can be overcome or at least temporarily neutralized. In the military-theoretical discussion, there is agreement that this can only work through a combination of different measures.

This could mean concentrating anti-drone and strike drone systems in a specific area of the breakthrough and creating a corridor there. Through it, the formation could quickly advance and break the enemy's momentum. Whether this will succeed is an open question. The decisive moment is when the situation tilts in favor of one of the sides - the so-called "hinge factor".

UKRAINIAN "LONG-RANGE SANCTIONS" REALLY WORK

- Let's talk separately about Ukraine's "long-range sanctions" against the Russian oil industry. You said earlier that such strikes can have a strategic effect only when they are carried out systematically. Currently, a significant part of Russia's oil refining capacity is not working, gasoline production no longer meets demand, and shortages and queues have arisen in several regions. Can we already talk about the manifestation of this cumulative effect? And how much can it affect Russia's ability to continue the war?

- Here we also need to distinguish between two things: unrefined and refined products, that is, on the one hand, crude oil, and on the other, gasoline and diesel fuel.

Crude oil continues to allow Russia to sell it on world markets. This is facilitated, among other things, by the crisis around Iran, which has led to a rise in oil prices. Although Ukraine has focused on loading and unloading ports such as Ust-Luga and caused serious damage there, Russia can still export oil. As long as this money flows into the Russian treasury, it remains available for the war economy.

The second direction is diesel fuel and gasoline. They are needed in everyday life, but also by the armed forces at the front. Here a paradoxical situation arises. Since there are no large-scale mechanized attacks now, the need for fuel has also decreased. There are Zhiguli and Bukhanka cars, but there are not a large number of heavy tanks with huge fuel consumption.

We see shortages, long lines and sometimes even fights. However, this has not yet led to a widespread protest movement. Therefore, the decisive lever, in my opinion, is not so much pressure on the supply of fuel to the population as pressure on the supply of resources and money for the military economy. To do this, first of all, it is necessary to limit the activities of the "shadow fleet" and block exports, in particular of crude oil.

As for the scale of the damage, I will give a figure from the Ukrainian General Staff, which I think is plausible. According to this data, from 43 to 45 percent of Russian oil refineries were destroyed or damaged. This is a huge scale. Footage from social networks also shows that Ukraine's "long-range sanctions," as the Ukrainians themselves call these strikes, are indeed producing results.

Russia, meanwhile, is trying to reactivate old decentralized production sites. This gives Ukraine more targets, but at the same time, Russian air defenses have to defend significantly more facilities.

Another important factor is the influence of American intelligence and artificial intelligence, in particular Palantir's MAVEN. This allows Ukraine to use its limited resources very purposefully, to choose new attack corridors and new targets. This is what makes the success we are seeing now possible.

UKRAINE IS TRYING TO ISOLATE CRIMEA AND CREATE A LOGISTICAL NIGHTMARE FOR RUSSIA

- In July, Ukrainian forces also significantly expanded their strikes on "shadow fleet" vessels in the Sea of Azov, and in recent days also in the Black Sea. How do you assess this campaign against this Russian "feeder fleet" and its possible military and economic consequences?

- In my opinion, it is strange that this campaign has only begun now, so late. The professional community has also long wondered why Ukraine is primarily attacking land corridors and supply routes, but not the ships of the "shadow fleet" in the Sea of Azov.

Now Ukraine has started this too. According to various reports, up to 150 ships may have been hit. Although it is unclear whether some of these are repeated strikes on the same ships. It is also unknown how many of them were seriously damaged or even sunk.

But the main thing is that the Sea of Azov is increasingly becoming a space for Russia in which it can no longer move freely. Even if some ships have been attacked repeatedly, Ukrainian figures and videos that are regularly published indicate a significant effect and a growing problem for Russia.

Why is one of the main focuses on the Sea of Azov? Recall the failed Ukrainian summer counteroffensive of 2023. Then Ukraine planned to quickly advance in the Zaporizhia region and reach the Sea of Azov, thus cutting off land communications and combining this with an attack on the bridge across the Kerch Strait. The operational plan was to cut off Crimea from supplies and create a real logistical nightmare for Russia.

Now Ukraine is trying to use drones to create the same situation it wanted to achieve with a ground offensive in 2023: isolate Crimea. The calculation is to create the same logistical nightmare that was hoped for then, and which could actually force Russia to negotiate. This is the plan that is now being implemented.

But it is fair to note that Russia is also trying to do something similar. It continues to attack Ukraine's critical infrastructure and deliver pinpoint strikes at the operational level in frontline areas. Among the targets are gas stations up to 100-160 kilometers from the front, railway connections, and primarily diesel and electric locomotives. Ukrainian grain ships in the Black Sea are also being attacked from Crimea.

In this regard, I would like to recall General Zaluzhny, the current ambassador to Great Britain. He rightly pointed out that Russia should not be underestimated and that the war is not over yet. Russia is still capable of preparing new surprises.

STRATEGIC DEPTH AIR DEFENSE – UKRAINE'S "ACHILLES HEEL"

- Ukraine and its European partners have announced their intention to create a joint system to counter ballistic missiles. In addition, the US has approved the licensed production of Patriot missiles for Ukraine. However, the implementation of these projects will take years. What can protect Ukrainian cities now?

- The first question is whether this will really last for years. In recent years, Ukraine has repeatedly shown that it is capable of doing incredible things in a very short time. When it comes to licensed production, I at least assume that the relevant preparatory work and preliminary agreements have already begun.

Trump, refocusing on Ukraine, tries to achieve a result through double pressure

It would be bad if this really turned out to be just a whim of President Trump, who quite unexpectedly raised this topic on the sidelines of the summit, and therefore now we need to think about how to implement it. The possibility of first producing Patriot missiles in Europe and then supplying them to Ukraine is also being discussed.

It is extremely important that this happens quickly. Ukraine has little time - this must be clearly stated. Strategic depth air defense is its "Achilles heel". Added to this are destructive strikes by guided aerial bombs at the operational-tactical level.

The US could supply Patriot missiles to Ukraine in the coming months to bridge the capability gap... But that's not the point right now

Now I'll move on to an assessment that you might find pessimistic. I said earlier that the war against Iran, from the American perspective, is not going the way they would like. They are almost desperate for an opportunity to show some success.

In my opinion, Trump, by focusing again on Ukraine, is trying to achieve a result through double pressure: on the one hand, pressure on Russia through its support for Ukraine, and on the other, perhaps pressure on Ukraine itself.

The US could supply Ukraine with Patriot missiles in the coming months to bridge this capability gap until it can produce such missiles on its own. But that is not the case at the moment. One might ask why? It seems as if Trump wants to preserve for himself the option in which Russian pressure on Ukraine is maintained, so that both sides are effectively forced to sit down at the negotiating table.

I emphasize separately that this is an assumption. But this is exactly the question that arose in my mind when I heard that licensed production is possible, but it takes time. Then I ask myself: what will happen until then?

Ukrainian cities must once again prepare for a very difficult winter. Although Ukrainian air defense is operating successfully: the level of shooting down Russian drones - primarily "Geran-2" and "Geran-3" - is 80-90%. But the Russians already have new models, "Geran-4" and "Geran-5", which are equipped with rocket engines, develop speeds of up to 500 kilometers per hour - much faster than interceptor drones.

Added to this are ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, which pose a serious threat. For these weapons systems, the kill rates have not improved as much as we would like to believe.

If Europeans talk about a joint project, it can only be successful if it produces concrete results in a short time. If this is again a project that will be worked on for years without any results, it will be too late for Ukraine.

- Could NATO allies from the territory of Poland or Romania protect at least part of Ukrainian airspace?

- This issue has been discussed for several years. It concerns participation in war. It is about whether the states concerned, their populations and politicians are ready to take such a step. And the question arises: what will this mean within NATO?

This issue has been discussed many times, but there has never been a final answer. We see that the relevant states are ready to protect and defend their own airspace. However, there is no readiness to extend this protection beyond their own airspace - to the airspace of Ukraine.

Trump recently raised the issue. He said that after a possible peace agreement, the US Air Force could, for example, defend the airspace over Ukraine – but only if such an agreement is reached.

ONLY THE USA CAN GUARANTEE EFFECTIVE CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA

- French President Emmanuel Macron has stated that the Coalition of the Willing already has a multinational force for Ukraine ready to operate after the cessation of hostilities. Exercises are also due to take place in the coming months to test plans for their deployment. How convincing is this mechanism from a military point of view? Can such a force really deter Russia from another attack?

- We have also discussed this repeatedly in the past. The key issue is that these forces should be deployed and equipped in such a way that in the event of a Russian attack on them on Ukrainian territory, there is certainty of an imminent effective response that will immediately put Russia in its place.

Or these forces must be deployed in such a way that their deterrent effect is so convincing that such an attack does not occur at all. The only partner capable of guaranteeing this is the United States of America, with its armed forces, which still remain the most powerful in the world.

Now close military cooperation between Russia and China is being talked about publicly

That is why Ukraine rightly emphasizes that ceasefire negotiations only make sense if it receives guarantees that Russia will not attack again. President Zelenskyy made it clear last year that Ukraine understands that it may not be able to return some of the occupied territories now. But it seeks a fair ceasefire and guarantees that Russia will not launch a new attack.

That is why Ukraine is fighting so fiercely. After all, if it gives in now or even gives up Donbas and the Russians can advance further, who will guarantee that Russia will not attack again in six months or a year, after it has regrouped and rearmed?

We often embellish reality. I have been saying for years that Americans and Europe must realize and accept: Russia is not fighting this war alone, but primarily with the support of China.

Now, close military cooperation between Russia and China is being talked about publicly. China benefits greatly from it: it can analyze the experience of the war in Ukraine without taking direct part in the fighting. Russia has relevant combat experience, while China has not fought a war for decades. Military cooperation between the two countries is becoming increasingly closer.

AFTER ESCALATION, THE CHANCE OF A CEASEFIRE IS INCREASING

- What scenario for the development of the war in the next six months do you consider the most likely?

- The paradox is that while we are currently witnessing an escalation of the conflict, in my opinion, at the same time the likelihood of a ceasefire is increasing. As I said, both sides understand that time is running out for them.

Ukraine needs to try to avoid another hard winter. Russia is trying to minimize the damage to its own economy. We see that the Ukrainian strikes are yielding results. In addition, we see that the American president is increasing the pressure because he wants to demonstrate the result before the midterm elections.

If everything really turns out as I predict, then some historian might later say: that's when both sides were so exhausted in this clinching that an agreement became possible. But new factors may also emerge that we haven't yet taken into account and that will change the course of the war in one direction or another - or prolong it.

- If you could name only three capabilities that Ukraine's partners should provide or finance in the coming months, what would they be?

- First, Ukraine's air defense. This is critically important. Ukraine must be able to repel Russian strategic strikes so that the Russian strategy of attrition - as Svechyn described it - does not succeed.

Second, the ability to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia. This includes supporting intelligence on the targets, as well as all the programs and capabilities that make such strikes possible.

Third, capabilities that will not allow the front to collapse at the tactical and operational levels.

If these three factors work together, Ukraine will be able to continue to hold on.

Vasyl Korotkyi , Berlin–Vienna

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 3:00 PM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Thanks for posting the latest propaganda, SECOND.

I know that Russia is succeeding militarily because the west is now going "all in" (as much as it dares) attacking Russian civilian targets.

Seems like we've given up on the front line and are shifting to terror attacks i.e. using violence to attempt swinging Russia's upcoming vote. A typical CIA approach.

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 4:49 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

What’s behind Maga influencer Laura Loomer’s about-face on Ukraine?

After a Kyiv visit, rightwing firebrand now supports Ukraine – but perhaps it’s just because Trump favors a winner

By James Risen | Sat 25 Jul 2026

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/25/laura-loomers-ukraine-
visit

Laura Loomer, the online Maga provocateur, has never worked in the White House or anywhere else in the government, but her sudden conversion to the Ukrainian cause this week is significant because her social media posts often have real policy implications in the second Trump administration.

The rightwing commentator has spent the last few days in Kyiv, where she announced a newfound sympathy for Ukraine in its long war with Russia, and admitted that she had previously fallen for Russian propaganda.

Loomer – who has previously echoed Kremlin talking points to her 2 million followers on social media – has enjoyed direct access to Trump since the 2024 presidential campaign. During the early months after Trump returned to office, Loomer used her online presence to push for ideological purges of government personnel, including many in the national security arena.

For a time, her power to break careers among foreign policy officials made her seem as if she were Trump’s de facto national security adviser.

It is unclear whether she still has that kind of pull inside the White House, but Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, certainly took her seriously when she arrived this week, holding a private meeting with her on Thursday.

Three days earlier, Loomer posted about experiencing her first air raid, as Russian missiles pounded the Ukrainian capital

“This is everyday for every Ukrainian,” she posting, adding she felt that she had been “an asshole for minimizing the struggle of Ukrainians for the last 5 years”.

“I often said I don’t care. Looking back, that wasn’t very nice of me to say. There are people in Ukraine who have to run to a bomb shelter everyday and some of us had the audacity to say Russia wasn’t wrong because we believed the lie that Ukraine is a country full of Nazi sympathizers. We have been so propagandized by Russia and we don’t even realize it.”

Before their meeting on Thursday, Zelenskyy’s office posted a statement saying: “It is really important that @LauraLoomer is in Ukraine and sees things with her own eyes as they are.”

Loomer’s change of heart is potentially important not only because she is close to Trump, but also because she has long served as a reliable barometer of Maga attitudes.

Loomer has long been disdainful of Ukraine, adopting what could only be described as a pro-Russian perspective. Many in Maga circles have for years held positive views of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, thanks to Russian propaganda that portrayed him as a bulwark against homosexuality and a defender of fundamentalist Christianity. They became convinced that the Russia-Ukraine war was a proxy fight between Russia’s fundamentalist Christianity and the EU’s western secularism.

Loomer’s shift comes at a critical moment for Ukraine, which recently lost one of its strongest supporters in Washington with the death this month of Lindsey Graham, the Republican senator from South Carolina who had consistently pushed for increased sanctions on Russia to punish Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine.

But Loomer’s change also coincides with what appears to be an important recent shift in Trump’s own views on Ukraine.

Trump returned to office openly hating Ukraine, at least in part because of the 2019 impeachment over his attempt to hold up aid to Ukraine in exchange for dirt on Joe Biden. Early in his second term, Trump humiliated Zelenskyy in an Oval Office meeting, cut off direct the supply of US weapons and forced Ukraine’s European allies to buy American weapons for Kyiv instead.

But Trump likes winners, and even without full support from Washington, Ukraine has been able to slow Russia’s advance. Kyiv has become a global leader in drone technology, and it has taken the war to Russia itself with long-range missile attacks on the country’s oil infrastructure, leading to an energy crisis in one of the world’s biggest oil-producing nations.

Clearly impressed with Ukraine’s performance, Trump announced at the Nato summit in Turkey earlier this month that the US would license Patriot missile technology to Ukraine, allowing Kyiv to produce the advanced air defense missiles on its own.

At the same time, Trump also supported a move in Congress, which had been backed by Graham, to impose new sanctions on Russia, while also seeming to back off an earlier insistence that Ukraine would have to agree to give up large swaths of territory in exchange for any US-brokered peace deal with Russia.

Trump’s policy shifts were modest, but significant; it is possible that Loomer changed her position simply in order to stay in lockstep with Trump.

But her about-face could be even more politically significant if it represents a broader thawing of Maga attitudes towards Ukraine and an awakening to the dangers of Russian propaganda.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 4:50 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Laura Loomer

A sudden and mysterious shift on Ukraine.

By Jim Newell | July 25, 2026

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2026/07/donald-trump-iran-news-sen
ate-maine-south-carolina.html

The conspiratorial MAGA influencer (and thus close confidante of Trump) has changed. Like most of her ilk, she was exceptionally critical of Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky for years during the war, saying the country was full of “Nazi apologists” and calling Zelensky a “jihadi apologist.” This week, however, she visited Ukraine, interviewed Zelensky, and changed her tune on the conflict. She is now staunchly pro-Ukraine and observed, “I feel like such an asshole for minimizing the struggle of Ukrainians for the last 5 years,” explaining, “We have been so propagandized by Russia and we don’t even realize it.” (A lot of people realized that the right-wing influencers had been propagandized by Russia.)

This is all well and good. Hopefully it makes some difference in right-wing politics and, more importantly, Trump’s view of the conflict. But—now it’s our turn to play conspiracy theorist—it’s also terribly difficult to take her conversion at face value. How does someone who’s built her substantial MAGA following and income in part by checking the “Hate Ukraine” box suddenly get on a trip to Kyiv to interview all of its powerful people and announce that she had been wrong all along? We’re talking about a complete 180. Loomer, for what it’s worth, has denied that she was paid by the Ukrainian government for the trip.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, July 25, 2026 5:27 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Ukraine veteran drives protests that topple army chief and defend Fedorov

Author: Alex Stezhensky | July 25, 2026, 07:14 AM

https://english.nv.ua/nation/dmytro-koziatynskyi-on-ukraine-s-cardboar
d-maidan-protests-and-military-reform-50627186.html

In an interview with NV, Ukrainian IT specialist and veteran Dmytro Koziatynskyi explains what drove him to call Ukrainians into the streets this year and last, and how civilians who joined the military in 2022 are changing its Soviet-era ways.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a change in the leadership of Ukraine’s Armed Forces on July 21. Mykhailo Drapatyi replaced Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander in chief.

The replacement came amid protests across Ukraine, including outside the presidential office in Kyiv. A rally in the square near the Ivan Franko Theater began after Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov was dismissed. Protesters later added another demand — Syrskyi’s removal.

At his “farewell” news conference, Fedorov said disagreements with the then-commander in chief were one reason he had been pushed out. He cited other reasons as well, including his efforts to combat corruption at the Defense Ministry.

Koziatynskyi emerged as a key figure in the protests that led to the replacement of the top military commander of a country at war. He initially used social media to call Ukrainians to the Franko Theater for a rally in support of Fedorov. After Drapatyi was appointed, Koziatynskyi warned that unless Fedorov returned as defense minister, the protest would become an indefinite demonstration starting July 24.

Koziatynskyi played a similar role last year. When the authorities tried to strip key powers from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, or NABU, and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, or SAPO, he was the first to call people into the streets.

Koziatynskyi spoke to NV about his acute sense of justice, his IT education, his military service, Ukraine’s commanders in chief and Soviet-era practices in the military.

NV has edited the interview into a monologue.

The protests

My birthday is July 21, and for the second year in a row, I have celebrated it at a protest.

Maybe it comes down to my acute sense of justice. When I see something outrageous, I cannot keep quiet. That is why I called on people to take to the streets both this year and last.

When I posted a call for a protest in 2025, I did not expect so many people to come. I thought it would just be my social media bubble. But I was shocked when I saw how many protesters were heading to Franko Square carrying cardboard signs.

The public gave NABU and SAPO an enormous vote of confidence then, and in my view, they earned it. We have all heard about Operation Midas. It was one of the defining events of 2025.

The law designed to destroy NABU and SAPO was clearly intended to let the people behind the Dynasty cooperative and former presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak keep “running their schemes.” I hope we never see Yermak in Ukrainian politics again and that he is held accountable for the actions he is suspected of.

Ukraine has a great many active, committed people. I had feared that all the activists were serving in the military or had been mobilized, leaving no one on the home front to bring about change. But that turned out not to be true. I saw that it was possible to win public support and that people would take to the streets for the right causes.

I truly felt that our civil society was mature enough to engage in democratic dialogue with the authorities. Our protest was peaceful. Society established that dialogue without rioting or calls to overthrow the government. Everyone understands perfectly well that wartime is no time to demand a change in the country’s political leadership.

The very fact that protests are possible during wartime shows how strong our democracy is.

Last year, I spoke with the security services. That is their job. None of them knew who I was, and they were genuinely trying to determine whether I was pro-Ukrainian or some kind of Russian agent.

I felt then that dialogue was possible and that we had been heard.

This year, I can also see that the president hears us and that change is possible in Ukraine.

Fedorov

Fedorov is a young reformer who began making changes the Defense Ministry badly needed. Without him, Ukraine probably would not have begun carrying out medium-range strikes. He was among those who championed the idea.

Neither Fedorov nor Yulia Svyrydenko’s Cabinet as a whole had enough time to carry out meaningful reforms. The constant reshuffles and turnover among ministers are a serious problem. Any government that takes office cannot pursue strategic reforms because it knows that in six months or a year, it will be replaced. The Cabinet therefore focuses on short-term reforms that pay immediate political dividends. This is not about particular individuals. It is an institutional problem.

The government does a terrible job of communicating. Officials reshuffle the government without explaining why or what they hope to achieve. The presidential office is especially bad at communicating. Fedorov was probably removed because he tried to dismantle corrupt schemes at the Defense Ministry. Many people did not like that, and they started getting in the president’s ear.

Fedorov has been blamed for failing to properly reform mobilization. But the territorial recruitment and social support centers, Ukraine’s military draft offices, answer to the commander in chief and form part of the Armed Forces. The Defense Ministry cannot fully reform them on its own without support from the president and the General Staff.

I also believe the National Police should be responsible for mobilization. Those duties were dumped on the military, and that was an extremely poor decision. In any country, the police are the institution legally authorized to use force. I do not understand why those duties were assigned to the military. That is how the draft offices, which are part of the military, came to be demonized.

Syrskyi’s assault regiments, such as Skelya, are used to scare civilians because people see what goes on there. This obviously makes potential recruits less willing to join the military. I say that even though I have always supported mobilization and encouraged people to enlist. At the same time, I understand those who are afraid to join because they fear dying while serving in Skelya rather than on the battlefield.

The commanders in chief

The violence in Skelya was made possible by the Soviet approach to military command. It shows disdain for initiative, a reliance on micromanagement and the commander in chief’s inability to keep up with the times. The question is whether generals are prepared to change. Syrskyi was not.

But Syrskyi is a capable military commander. He has a deep understanding of the battlefield, commands unquestioned respect among the generals and has the toughness a commander in chief needs. I have no doubt that Syrskyi remained true to his oath. I do not want him punished in any way. But I do want him given an honorable retirement so that a younger generation of generals can take over.

I also have many questions about Valerii Zaluzhnyi. One concerns the Zaporizhzhya counteroffensive. I may not be sufficiently qualified to judge, but as someone who served in the military, I believe the 2023 counteroffensive was dictated by politics.

Either Zaluzhnyi understood that the counteroffensive was a bad idea and allowed it to proceed anyway. If so, he gave in to political pressure instead of shielding the troops from those political games. The entire area was mined. A counteroffensive was simply impossible.

If he genuinely believed it was a good plan, then perhaps he is a poor military commander. Talking for months about where the main thrust would take place and then attacking in exactly that location is extremely strange.

I also object to the way he left military service following a decision by a military medical commission. Wounded service members cannot obtain disability status, yet a general is medically discharged and sent into civilian life. That is unacceptable. He could have stepped down from his position without being discharged from military service. Service members can work at the Defense Ministry while remaining on active duty.

From IT to the military

I am an IT specialist by training. I earned a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering from Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and a master’s degree in the same field in the Czech Republic. I defended my thesis in 2024 while already serving in the Armed Forces.

I lived in Europe and realized that I did not want to leave Ukraine. It is my country, and life here is wonderful. When the full-scale invasion began, I saw it as someone robbing your apartment — you would not just stand there and watch. I could not stand by while my country was being robbed. So I returned to Kyiv in spring 2022.

I first established a small charity that ran tactical medicine courses. I then joined the 47th Brigade as an assault soldier.

It was difficult to simply join the military. I wanted to be mobilized rather than sign a contract because I believed the war would last less than three years. I thought that if the war ended while I was under contract, I would still have to continue serving.

At the time, the minimum mobilization age was 27, and I was too young. To be mobilized, I had to use personal contacts to transfer my registration from the draft office in Kyiv’s Dniprovskyi District to the one in the Holosiivskyi District. I then had to persuade the military commissar to mobilize me.

IT specialists must fight just like other Ukrainians. It is a constitutional duty. It does not matter how much money you earn. Many people in the military earned substantial incomes as civilians but left their jobs and businesses to enlist. They are fighting like everyone else.

But no one has limitless physical or mental endurance. Service members need rest, and that will be possible only when full rotations are introduced. Civilians must mobilize so that there is a reserve. The argument that IT specialists donate money and therefore should not have to fight is nonsense. We are all equal before the Constitution.

I made a point of not romanticizing the war. Civilians do not really understand what the military is like. The camaraderie is real, but the military is ultimately a cross section of society, with all kinds of people. There is also an enormous amount of routine and waiting — for everything. You can arrive at a training ground in the morning and wait all day just to fire one magazine.

The most intense period of my service came after I transferred to the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion. During an assault in the Kupyansk sector in July 2023, many of the guys from the battalion’s first company and the Honor unit were killed. The Ulf Medical Service worked for two days straight, constantly heading out to evacuate the wounded. It was extremely hard.

When I returned from an evacuation that evening, I collapsed onto the bed and fell asleep because I was so exhausted. I can only imagine how exhausted the infantrymen were. While it is happening, adrenaline carries you through and you do your job. Then you get back to your quarters, take off your body armor and realize just how tired you are. I slept until the next morning, when it was time to get back to work.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Sunday, July 26, 2026 6:30 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Weekend Update #195

Phillips P. OBrien
Jul 26, 2026

This week the Ukrainian long-range attacks on Russian Wildberries warehouses and infrastructure (think a Russian version of Amazon) very much continued apace. https://meduza.io/feature/2026/07/24/nedelyu-nazad-vsu-nachali-bit-po-
skladam-wildberries-vspominaem-chto-proizoshlo-s-teh-por

This campaign causes some mixed emotions in me. If it distracts from the oil campaign, that is definitely not what I would say is an efficient use of Ukrainian resources. It seems that there have been only 5 strikes on refineries since the Wildberries campaign started. With oil prices back on the rise, I personally believe that efforts against the refineries remain top priority.

As for the benefits of the Wildberries campaign—I can see the argument that they will possess dual use components (though what percentage of their possessions are dual use is unknown and I would imagine small). I also understand the idea that it will disperse Russian air defense. So it can have some strategic advantages.

However, my guess is that this is really aimed at Putin’s political standing. It’s a way of undermining the basic “deal” of his regime with the Russian people—I will provide you goodies if you give me power. That bargain looks dicey if all your goodies are blowing up.

Such campaigns often do not work as expected, so this might be hopeful. Certainly, if it means that striking these warehouses distracts from the campaign against refineries, I find that an odd choice. However, it could be that the Ukrainians believe that Putin’s political standing is in trouble and this is a way to seriously undermine it.

More at https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-195-the-worst-we
ek

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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