Russia Invades Ukraine. Again by captaincrunch

REAL WORLD EVENT DISCUSSIONS

Russia Invades Ukraine. Again

POSTED BY: CAPTAINCRUNCH
UPDATED: Friday, July 24, 2026 19:06
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Friday, July 24, 2026 3:37 PM

THG

Is also JJ. Keep it real please, and use a VPN

I'm sure you agree, aye comrade?

T

When Crimea falls to Ukraine, Putin is going to have a huge problem | Ben Hodges

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Friday, July 24, 2026 5:30 PM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Got a timeline for that prediction, Ben?

Of course not!

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Friday, July 24, 2026 6:10 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

How Cutting Off Crimea and Southern Ukraine Is Breaking Russia's Offensive Momentum

By Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv | 24.07.2026 20:00

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4147711-how-cutting-off-crimea-an
d-southern-ukraine-is-breaking-russias-offensive-momentum.html

How Cutting Off Crimea and Southern Ukraine Is Breaking Russia's Offensive Momentum

Destroyed Bridges, a Paralyzed Sea, Fuel Shortages, and Broken Supply Lines: At Last, It's Paying Off.

Analyzing the Situation on the Southern Front

The summer of 2026 on the southern theater of operations has been marked by the systematic attrition of Russian forces. In early June, Ukraine's Defense Forces launched a large-scale campaign officially dubbed "Logistics Lockdown." Rather than relying on costly frontal assaults against heavily fortified positions, the operation aims to methodically and surgically sever the Russian military's logistical lifelines—roads, bridges, railway junctions, and maritime supply routes across the Azov and Black seas.

By mid-July, the campaign had reached an unprecedented scale. During June alone, Ukrainian forces conducted precision strikes on 15 bridges—eight railway bridges and seven road bridges. The attacks spanned virtually the entire occupied south: from Ichky, Rozdolne, Vladyslavivka, and Voinka in Crimea to bridges over the Korsak River in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; from the Henichesk Strait and Chonhar crossings in Kherson Oblast to bridges over the Luhanchyk and Aidar rivers in the east. In July, additional targets included bridges in Donetsk Oblast near Huselnykove and Staromariivka, the railway bridge across the Syvash, and other critical infrastructure near Prymorsk.

Equally significant is the operation bearing the ironic—but devastating for the enemy—codename "MoLoCHKa" ("Moscow Will Fall Through Crimea"), launched on July 6. During its first 15 days alone, Ukrainian forces struck 183 vessels belonging to Russia's shadow fleet in the Azov and Black seas.

These efforts have been complemented by long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, electronics manufacturing facilities, chemical plants, heavy weapons factories, ammunition depots, and other strategic military-industrial targets deep inside Russia. Taken together, they form a comprehensive campaign aimed at isolating and systematically degrading the enemy's ability to wage war.

How has this unprecedented blockade already reshaped the battlefield in southern Ukraine? Ukrinform examines the situation together with leading military experts.

THE DOMINO EFFECT: HOW ATTACKS ON LOGISTICS ARE PARALYZING THE FRONT

The campaign's most significant achievement on land has been the effective disruption of the M-14 highway—the principal logistical artery connecting Mariupol with the occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. For years, this route served as the backbone of Russian military logistics, sustaining occupation forces on the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson axes while also supplying occupied Crimea.

Its degraded transport capacity has triggered a cascade of tactical setbacks for Russian forces, undermining their ability to sustain offensive operations, rotate personnel, and reinforce frontline units.

According to military expert Dmytro Sniehyrov, the blockade has already translated into tangible territorial gains for Ukraine's Defense Forces. Ukrainian units launched a successful counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, pushing Russian troops back around Maliivka, Sichneve, Novoheorhiivka, and Zaporizke, and re-establishing fire control over more than 33 square kilometers of territory. In neighboring Kherson Oblast, Ukrainian forces continue to hold the commanding heights on the west bank of the Dnipro River, while any attempts by Russian troops to establish positions on the islands in the Dnipro Delta are swiftly neutralized by artillery and swarms of FPV drones.

Perhaps the clearest indicator of the success of the "Logistics Lockdown" campaign is the steady decline in the enemy's firepower. According to Sniehyrov, logistical shortages have forced Russian forces to impose strict limits on their artillery expenditure.

"Disruptions to supplies from Crimea to the southern front have already reduced the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery fire from 2.4:1 to 1.6:1," Sniehyrov said.

This assessment is echoed by Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst with the Information Resistance group. Assessing the southern operational zone, he argues that the Russian offensive stretching from Stepnohirsk, through the Orikhiv axis, to the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts has effectively ground to a halt. Moreover, units of Russia's 58th Combined Arms Army are not only failing to advance but are increasingly struggling to hold their positions.

"Even Russian Z-war correspondents are openly acknowledging this. They complain that their units south of Stepnohirsk risk being encircled. They also acknowledge that, sooner or later, they will likely be forced to abandon Kamianske, as it will become increasingly difficult to defend. This is another consequence of the logistics lockdown. Russian troops are no longer receiving sufficient ammunition, equipment, or supplies. They are experiencing difficulties rotating personnel and deploying reinforcements. Even the delivery of drinking water has become problematic, which, particularly during the summer, is a critical issue," Kovalenko said.

He added that the Orikhiv axis has effectively fallen into operational stagnation.

"It is fair to say that Russia's plans to resume offensive operations there have failed completely. As for the Huliaipole axis, fighting remains relatively active only along a narrow, roughly 15-kilometer stretch between Huliaipole and Huliaipilske," the analyst noted.

Elsewhere, the situation is proving no easier for Russian forces.

"They are having trouble not only advancing but even holding their current positions. We recently saw troops from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment 'Skala' expand their zone of control. This was not a publicity stunt—it was a genuine battlefield success. In fact, Russian sources themselves had been complaining for weeks that Ukrainian forces were exerting heavy pressure in that sector. The first reports confirming the Defense Forces' advance actually appeared on Russian channels. For understandable operational security reasons, Ukraine's official institutions do not release such information immediately," the expert explained.

"Moreover, official battlefield maps, including those produced by DeepState, do not fully reflect the gains made by Ukrainian forces, which are now operating well beyond the publicly indicated lines of control. That is why I believe we are likely to see further gains in the coming weeks. All of this stems from Russia's steadily diminishing ability to properly sustain its forces in both offensive and defensive operations."

A similar dynamic is unfolding within Russia's Dnipro Group of Forces in Kherson Oblast.

"Overall, the occupied part of Kherson Oblast is becoming even more isolated than the Crimean Peninsula itself. In fact, the situation there is considerably more critical for the enemy. It is already evident that our comprehensive effort to isolate the southern operational zone is producing tangible results. Russia is being exhausted not only militarily but economically as well," Oleksandr Kovalenko argues.

According to Kovalenko, Russia is now forced to devote the lion's share of its resources simply to keeping its logistics network operational as Ukrainian forces continue to systematically dismantle it. The disruption of maritime cargo traffic across the Sea of Azov—to Crimea, Berdiansk, and Mariupol—combined with Ukraine's growing pressure in the Black Sea, is steadily eroding Russia's ability to sustain its southern grouping of forces, creating what Kovalenko describes as increasingly catastrophic conditions.

"Of course, I would not rush to say that a decisive turning point in our favor is imminent. But there is no doubt that the southern operational zone is where Russian forces currently find themselves in their most difficult position," the Information Resistance analyst said.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE AUTUMN RUBICON: WHAT COMES NEXT?

The undeniable successes of the summer campaign raise an obvious question for Ukraine's military leadership and society alike: What comes next? Will this logistical paralysis ultimately translate into the collapse of Russia's southern front? And how long will this favorable window of opportunity remain open?

The experts agree that Ukraine has entered a critical phase that is likely to shape the course of the war throughout 2026 and 2027. Kovalenko believes this so-called "window of opportunity" has already opened, but it will not remain open indefinitely. In his assessment, it will last only two to two and a half months—through the end of September. During that period, the priority must be to consolidate gains on mainland Ukraine, since without them any future operation to liberate Crimea would have little prospect of success.

The principal challenge looming on the autumn horizon lies not on the battlefield but in Russia's domestic political calendar. Once the September 2026 State Duma elections conclude, the Kremlin will have greater political freedom to make unpopular decisions.

"Everything will depend on the objectives the Kremlin ultimately sets for itself. If its goal is to hold the Ukrainian territories it already occupies while continuing its slow, incremental offensive, it will need to mobilize approximately 500,000 personnel. That would mean Ukraine would likely have to spend another year to a year and a half fighting primarily in a defensive, attritional campaign. That is the most unfavorable scenario," Kovalenko predicts.

Kovalenko also does not rule out a more ambitious scenario in which Moscow seeks to mobilize up to one million personnel to open a new axis of attack. Although such an undertaking would require considerably more time, he considers it the most serious long-term threat. For that reason, he argues, the Defense Forces' priority during August and September should be to inflict maximum losses while improving their tactical positions to such an extent that any future wave of Russian mobilized troops would be blunted against well-prepared Ukrainian defenses before it could be fully brought to bear.

Even so, there are serious doubts about Russia's ability to absorb, train, equip, and sustain such a force. Israeli military commentator Sergei Auslender argues that reports circulating within Russia's Z-community about the mobilization of 1.2 million people are a classic information operation. Their purpose, he says, is to gauge public sentiment and test society's willingness to accept another large-scale mobilization.

"Russia's mobilization system is unlikely to be capable of simultaneously absorbing and equipping even several hundred thousand personnel, let alone more than a million. The Russian authorities clearly remember the consequences of the 2022 mobilization and understand that another large-scale draft could trigger significant internal migration, widespread draft evasion, and a marked increase in social tensions," Auslender said.

Even if Russia could theoretically assemble such a force, another question remains: how would it fuel and sustain it while Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to erode the country's industrial and energy base? Auslender points to the recent attacks on the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat complex in Bashkortostan—which accounted for roughly 5% of Russia's petroleum product output—and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, a facility critical to supplying Russia's southern grouping of forces. Even if the war were to end today, he argues, restoring this infrastructure would take years.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine's strategy for the coming months appears increasingly well defined. It rests on the combined effect of several parallel efforts: maintaining the blockade of the Azov and Black seas, systematically dismantling Russia's logistics network, and conducting long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russia.

"If, during this period, we can improve our battlefield positions to the point where they substantially reduce the future impact of a Russian mobilization, we will enter late 2026 and early 2027 from a much stronger position. If, however, this trend reverses, then this 'window of opportunity' will undoubtedly begin to close much sooner," Kovalenko concluded, stressing the critical importance of maintaining the current operational tempo.

The "Logistics Lockdown" campaign and the blockade of the Azov and Black seas have transformed the southern theater into a zone of growing logistical and resource shortages for Russian occupation forces. The decline in Russia's offensive potential and the loss of its operational initiative in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts are a direct result of Ukraine's precision campaign against bridges, oil refineries, critical logistics infrastructure, and the shadow fleet.

The coming two to three months are likely to prove decisive. If Ukraine can maintain the current pace of isolating the southern theater before any potential autumn mobilization in Russia, it will be well positioned to shape the strategic balance in the 2027 campaign, potentially turning Russia's mounting logistical crisis into a far broader operational collapse.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Friday, July 24, 2026 7:06 PM

THG

Is also JJ. Keep it real please, and use a VPN

Quote:
Originally posted by SIGNYM:
Got a timeline for that prediction, Ben?

Of course not!

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

The plan isn’t to storm the peninsula. It’s to make staying impossible. Even Russian officers now call Crimea a front-line region.

T

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