Russia Invades Ukraine. Again by captaincrunch

REAL WORLD EVENT DISCUSSIONS

Russia Invades Ukraine. Again

POSTED BY: CAPTAINCRUNCH
UPDATED: Monday, October 13, 2025 09:50
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VIEWED: 339978
PAGE 182 of 182

Friday, October 10, 2025 10:26 AM

Keep it real please

All the bullshit put forth by comrades kiki and signym blaming others for what Russia did is exposed. Just as history will expose the rest of his war crimes.

T

Putin says Russian air defenses caused the 2024 Azerbaijan plane crash

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Friday, October 10, 2025 10:37 AM

6IXSTRINGJACK

#Rootin4Putin

--------------------------------------------------

For all that I've blessed, and all that I've wronged. In dreams until my death, I will wander on.

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Friday, October 10, 2025 10:58 AM

THG

Keep it real please

Quote:
Originally posted by 6ixStringJack:

#Rootin4Putin

No surprise there Gilligan. You're what we call, white trash.

T

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Friday, October 10, 2025 1:44 PM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Quote:
Originally posted by THG:
All the bullshit put forth by comrades kiki and signym blaming others for what Russia did is exposed. Just as history will expose the rest of his war crimes.

Dood, not a war crime. Russians were shooting at Ukie drones. Russian missiles are set to explode if they miss their target, unfortunately it exploded near the plane.

Not only do you have TDS bad, you've got PDS too. You're a mess, man.

-----------
"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Friday, October 10, 2025 2:51 PM

THG

Keep it real please

Quote:
Originally posted by SIGNYM:
Quote:
Originally posted by THG:

All the bullshit put forth by comrades kiki and signym blaming others for what Russia did is exposed. Just as history will expose the rest of his war crimes.
Dood, not a war crime. Russians were shooting at Ukie drones. Russian missiles are set to explode if they miss their target, unfortunately it exploded near the plane.

Not only do you have TDS bad, you've got PDS too. You're a mess, man.

Too funny... Both you and Putin are still blaming Ukraine. If Ukraine wasn't using a drone Russia would not have shot down the plane. And, waited years to admit it was a Russian missile.

T

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Saturday, October 11, 2025 6:07 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

The European Parliament has called for lifting restrictions that prevent Ukraine from using Western-supplied weapons against military targets on Russian territory, according to a resolution adopted on October 9 in Strasbourg.

Western governments have long limited Ukraine’s ability to strike inside Russia, citing fears of escalation, NATO entanglement, and retaliatory attacks on Europe. These limitations have constrained how Ukraine can respond to Russian attacks launched from inside Russian territory.

Most EU member states permit Ukraine to strike Russian military targets near the border using supplied weapons, but deeper strikes into Russian territory remain largely prohibited - forcing Ukraine to rely on domestically-produced long-range drones and missiles for attacks on refineries, military installations, and ammunition depots hundreds of kilometers inside Russia.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/10/09/european-parliament-backs-ukrai
nes-right-to-strike-military-targets-inside-russia-with-western-weapons/

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, October 11, 2025 6:10 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 10 that it signed an agreement with the German MoD to provide financial support for key projects that support the digitization of Ukraine’s defense sector, including Ukraine’s DELTA battlefield management program, Army+ and Reserve+ systems, the DOT-Chain Defense Marketplace, and strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defense.[25] German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 10 that it will supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of additional Skyranger 35 mobile ground-based air defense systems based on the Leopard 1 tank chassis and that the contract is valued at hundreds of millions of euros, which an unspecified EU member state will finance using frozen Russian assets.[26] The United Kingdom (UK) announced on October 10 that the UK recently delivered hundreds of Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) to Ukraine five months ahead of schedule.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 10 that Ukraine and the Netherlands signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on joint drone production.[28]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive
-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, October 11, 2025 6:21 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Putin Flutters His Eyelashes and Trump Swoons (Melania Too)

A Catechism To Understand The Reality Of Trump, Russia and Ukraine

By Phillips P. Obrien | Oct 11

https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/putin-flutters-his-eyelashes-an
d

If you can, turn your mind back to almost two weeks ago, not long after Trump started talking, once again, about helping Ukraine and hammering Russia. His rhetorical flourishes such as calling Russia a “paper tiger”, depressingly caused people to again lose their mind and start fantasizing about the USA sending masses of weapons to Ukraine. Yes, we were told Tomahawk missiles would soon be sent and Trump would definitely authorize Ukraine to fire them into Russia. As always the narrative was spread far and wide by that extraordinary self-deceiving group that claims to support both Trump and Ukraine. Sadly, the Ukrainians even seemed to fall for this line.
. . .

And what has Ukraine received in concrete terms lately from all this pivoting? Nothing. Indeed even during Trump’s most extreme moments of vocal pivot no new sanctions were placed on Russia, no weapons were rushed to Ukraine, the material changes were non-existent.

And most likely nothing will happen, unless Putin again drastically miscalculates and offends Trump so much that the US president feels so broken-hearted that he needs to go all Mean Girls on the Russian dictator.

With all this in mind, I thought I would write a short catechism of points, so help subscribers understand the reality of the Trump-Putin-Ukraine relationship.

1. Trump desperately wants to work with and gain the respect of Vladimir Putin. Putin might push him too far, but always has in his back pocket the possibility of bewitching the US president.

2. Trump hates Zelensky, wants the Ukrainian president to be out of power and would like Ukraine to be ruled by someone who will cut a deal that would hand over much of Ukraine to Putin. Trump views Zelensky as an enemy (thinks a Ukrainian version of James Comey) who betrayed him about Hunter Biden. When Trump acts like he favors Zelensky, it is a lie.

3. Trump has no emotional interest in helping Ukraine or the Ukrainian people. He would be more than happy to see Ukraine wiped from the map.

4. Trump has materially reduced the support to Ukraine from the USA since being president and will keep doing that unless Putin messes up. For instance, Trump starved Ukraine of air defense during his first 7 months as president, which is contributing to the terrible attacks Russia is inflicting on Ukraine now. He has cut back intelligence sharing, has slow-walked deliveries of aid. He has weakened Ukraine greatly in comparison to the Biden Administration.

5. Trump has materially protected Putin. Since becoming president he has put no new sanctions on Russia and loosened some on Belarus. These moves have clearly helped Russia evade certain restrictions more and more efficiently. At the same time his one move made supposedly to punish Russia (putting high tariffs on India) have had the direct opposite affect and increased Indian purchases of Russian oil and pushed India to cooperate more with Russia strategically. That indeed might have been the plan all along.

One final point. All this fantasizing about Trump helping Ukraine is dangerous. Not only does it provide false hopes, it acts as a brake on European states who want to do more for Ukraine. Many of them are still desperate to appeal to Trump and, worried about keeping the US president on side, have not given Ukraine the support they could. They need to realize that Trump’s first love is and always will be Putin—and European leaders need to look after Europe’s interests on their own.

They do not have the option of batting their eyelashes and have Trump come running. Vladimir Putin does (and just has). That is the difference.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Saturday, October 11, 2025 10:08 AM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

THUGR, here is a lesson in critical thinking:

O'Brien's article is fact-free mind reading. It attributes all kinds of motivations to Trump and Putin. It is framed in emotional language, how they "feel" (as opposed to what they "think"), appealing to emotion-based people like you.

But in that whole diatribe, there's only one verifiable fact:

The flow of weapons to Ukraine. Why the flow slowed to a trickle is, of course, explained by how Trump "feels" (an unverifiable statement), not to real world constraints like ...

Oh, say, LACK OF INVENTORY. Apparent uselessness of weapons already provided, such as tanks, artillery, the F16, and the Patriot, which has a poor record of shooting down Russian missiles in addition to being expensive. Since the USA has other commitments besides Ukraine, it can't afford to hemorrhage its entire arsenal into one war. (FWIW the last USA weapon still effectively in the fight is the HIMARS.)

-----------
"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Saturday, October 11, 2025 10:10 AM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Quote:
Watch: MSM Interview Covers Up Ukrainian Fighter's Swastika Tattoo

Saturday, Oct 11, 2025 - 08:05 AM

In another embarrassing and revealing moment for Western mainstream media and its many puff pieces on Ukraine's neo-Nazi Azov Regiment, Canadian national broadcaster CBC has aired a news report this week from "an elite training facility" of its 3rd Assault Brigade in Kiev, featuring a fighter with a swastika tattoo on his arm.

The footage, released Thursday, blurred out the swastika tattoo of one of the main military trainers interviewed, but failed to do so in the video’s YouTube thumbnail. Comments were turned off, with a note attached in the YouTube description which reads: "A tattoo of an offensive symbol has been blurred in this video." Watch (officer with tattoo starts at :16 mark)

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Sunday, October 12, 2025 6:39 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

1. Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025.

2. Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables into cheaper drones to scale Russian forces’ ability to conduct drone strikes at farther ranges.

3. Russian forces are trying to scale the production of fiber-optic UAVs to increasingly intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber drones.

4. Russian developers reportedly introduced fiber-optic FPV UAVs that can function as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance UAVs, extending Russian tactical drone ranges to up to 60 kilometers.

5. Russian forces are pursuing moving targets in the near rear with Shahed (Ceran) and Cerbera UAVs with integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.

6. Russian developers are fielding new countermeasures against Ukrainian drone interceptors, chiefly via newly integrated radio detectors.

More details at https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-gen
eration-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Sunday, October 12, 2025 7:00 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Weekend Update #154: The Strategic Air War And The Approaching Winter

Russian Attacks, Ukrainian Options for Defense, and F-16s

By Phillips P. Obrien | Oct 12, 2025

https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-154-the-strategi
c

The Strategic Air War And The Approaching Winter

Part 1: The Russian Campaign To Make Ukrainian Life Unbearable

The war this winter will to a large degree be determined by how the ranged campaigns by both sides progress—and this last week there were some signs of just how intense and destructive that war will be.

The Russians used much of their strategic air power to go after Ukrainian energy supplies and power generation. For those who are relatively new to following the strategic air war, attacking Ukrainian power generation—especially with winter approaching—has been a favorite target of the Russians for a few years. Oddly, they had some real successes attacking power generation during the winter of 2023-2024, though last winter the attacks did not seem so effective. It might have been that the Biden Administration helped Ukraine prepare its air defense better for last winter and for most of the time Ukrainians had access to power and heat.

Unfortunately, Ukrainian air defense is clearly coming under greater strain this Autumn—precisely as the Russians are once again going after power generation. Remember, the Trump administration cut off Ukraine off from any new US military aid for the first 7 months of the year, and actually at one point put a freeze specifically on crucial anti-air elements such as Patriot missiles and other equipment. In other words, the Trump administration for much of the year has worked actively to help the Russians in their campaign. Its worth noting that only in the second half of September did the Trump administration agree to its first PURL order to sell Patriot ammunition to Europeans to send on to Ukraine.

The Trump administration, as such, has helped Russia a great deal until now.

And this attempt to weaken Ukraine meant that Ukrainian anti-air capabilities were less strong this summer than it should have been—and it has stresses the system. Ukrainian anti-air now is weaker than it should have been if the USA had stood by it—and they are coming under great strain now.

This last week, for instance, the Russians seemed to ramp up attacks on power generation targets and had some real successes. Bloomberg reported that the Russians might have taken out approximately half of Ukraine’s natural gas production—before the war Ukraine met almost all of its needs in this area.

Then on Thursday night, the Russians launched a massive attack on power generation with a focus on Kyiv. According to President Zelensky, about 450 Russian UAVs and 30 missiles were fired at “everything that sustains normal life, everything the Russians want to deprive us of.” He then went on to elaborate:

“It is precisely the civilian and energy infrastructure that is the main target of Russia’s strikes ahead of the heating season,”

And these big attacks are just part of what seems to have been a regular series of attacks for weeks. This is one area where Ukraine’s partners need to do far more. Maybe they were lulled into a false sense of security by the Ukrainian defense last year when the Biden Administration was providing billions of dollars in air defense equipment. However, this winter is not last winter. Russian production of UAVs is much higher now and the assumption must be that these attacks will go on in mass for the foreseeable future.

And this is the key point—Ukrainian air defense needs to be built up in layered mass too. Ukrainian interceptions of different air defense systems continues, percentage-wise, at a relatively high pace. According to General Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces are intercepting about 75% of all systems fired by the Russians. However, if the Russians are firing hundreds, maybe even thousands, of systems per week, that means that hundreds are reaching their targets.

Ukraine must be aided to increase this interception percentage markedly—and sadly the Trump administration once again seems to be delaying. Just last night Zelensky and Trump talked about the war. Apart from asking for Tomahawks (which Trump did not agree to do—despite all the hopeful headlines) it seems that Zelensky spent much of his time asking for air defense support. The Ukrainians, always, tried to put a positive spin on this and said Trump took their concerns seriously—but the White House offered no comment. For air defense (as for Tomahawks) Trump seemed to listen and offer little concrete.

And it is getting relatively late in the day for the USA anyway. We are now in the middle of October—this aid needs to be on its way very soon or it will get there too late.

Thankfully, at least, some European states are doing more to help. In the last week, there were a number of stories about different European initiatives that are actually underway to help Ukraine.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/10/11/8002298/
https://www.twz.com/air/entire-family-of-vampire-counter-drone-systems
-unveiled
https://kyivindependent.com/rheinmetall-to-supply-ukraine-with-additio
nal-skyranger-air-defense-systems/

Note—there are three different links above to different initiatives—things are being tried.

And the Ukrainians have been developing more and more systems of their own. With the Trump administration slow-walking support—this will be Europe’s fight with Ukraine.

Part 2: Ukraine’s Option For Response

One of the reasons I’ve been so impressed with how Ukraine has waged its war, is that it has tried not to commit the kinds of war crimes that Russia commits against it multiple times a day. The Russians regularly attack Ukrainian civilians in hospitals, nurseries and, of course, their homes. The Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants, which underpin the necessities of civilian life, are most probably war crimes. The Russians are supposed to take steps to mitigate the damage of such attacks on civilians. As it is—the attacks seemed designed specifically to make civilian life unbearable. That is the definition of a war crime.

Of course in a larger sense we are now in a world where the whole idea of there being “war crimes” is becoming increasingly meaningless. Not only are the Russians committing these crimes with impunity on a daily basis, but the USA is destroying boats on the high seas that represent no threat to US forces and which could be seized without their destruction and the death of their crews. By most estimates these American attacks are war crimes. And yet they continue unabated. With two of the UN’s Security Council members now openly committing such crimes, does the whole concept of their even being war crimes have any future?

Btw I have been thinking about writing a piece about the implications of this—we do seem to be entering an era where the idea of a war crime is being widely disregarded—and chances are this disregard will grow. This could have a massive impact on how wars are fought and what elements are targeted in the near future. It could change our whole discourse about war. Of course it would be as depressing as hell to write and read. Yet, maybe it must be written.

Notably, Ukraine, has until now gone to great lengths to wage war without committing such war crimes. Their campaign against Russian fuel refineries, for instance, does not directly impact civilian life in the way that shutting off the power to a large city would.

Note—the Ukrainians kept their campaign against refineries up this week, but on a smaller pace. They hit, on Friday night, a refinery 1400 kilometres from Ukraine in Ufa. I will catch up with this campaign in the coming week I am sure.

What the Ukrainians have not done is try to turn the lights out in Moscow or St Petersburg—in response to what the Russians have been doing for years to cities such as Kyiv.

And the Ukrainians could conceivably do this now—with their own systems. This week for the first time, President Zelensky claimed Ukraine had launched an attack with a small number of both its homemade Flamingo and Neptune missiles. He did not specify what was attacked, just said the attack was successful. However, if the Flamingo FP-5 cruise missile is actually on track production-wise, these kinds of attacks should now happen more often.

Remember, when the existence of Flamingo was first announced in August, it was said that the Ukrainians aimed to produce 7 per day by October.

And, btw, just two weeks ago a picture was released of a Ukrainian ranged attack against a target in Belgorod in Russia which, due to the large cavity it caused, would most likely have to be a Neptune or Flamingo.
The crater after the strike on the night of September 22-23 on the Frese plant in Belgorod. Photo from open sources.
Looks Like A Heavy Payload Attack

This is not the result of a lighter drone attack.

Moreover, it is unlikely that Russian air defense would be capable of protecting its own power plants. Russian refineries, for instance, are being hit with what looks like astonishing regularity. Indeed, often Russia seems to leave targets unprotected until they are attacked, and then tries to rush air defenses in place in a reactive way. If the Ukrainians decided to focus on power generation as well as on refineries, it would be an epic challenge for Russian air defense (which still has to try and protect its military forces in Ukraine itself).

So here we are—it's October and Ukrainian production of ranged systems is also ramping up. The debate the Ukrainians are almost certainly having is one of deterrence through punishment when it comes to power generation attack. As the Russians are producing in mass and will almost certainly go after Ukrainian power generation all winter, do the Ukrainians answer in kind? Remember, all the power plants that support Moscow and St Petersburg are easily in the range of Flamingos, let alone other systems that the Ukrainians have already been using for months against targets in and around those cities.

The Ukrainians have clearly not wanted to match Russia’s actions in this area until now. However, with the Russians repeatedly going after Ukrainian cities, and the US slow walking any support, they might decide they have no option.

We live in a time where all standards are collapsing before our eyes. This might be a terrible winter for both Ukrainian and Russian civilians—welcome to the new world.

F-16s And Ukrainian Air Defense

The last thing I wanted to do in this weekend review is encourage you to listen to, or read, this interview with USAF Lt general David Deptula (retd) and one of Ukraine’s leading F-16 pilots. For those who do not know Gen Deptula, he is one of the most important air force officers of the post-Cold War world, helped plan much of the air war for Desert Storm and continues to be one of the most engaged thinkers about air power from his present position as head of The Michell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ukraines-f-16-force-innovation-impac
t-and-resolve-in-the-face-of-aggression/

What comes out in this discussion is just how the F-16s have become vital to helping Ukraine defend its skies from Russian missiles and drones. The F-16s, now as much as the Patriots, seem to be a crucial layer in Ukraine’s capabilities to defend itself this winter. For instance, a story was recently released about one Ukrainian pilot shooting down 6 Russian cruise missiles in one flight.

The importance of the F-16 in this air defense role points out the hollowness of the arguments that were given for years about why Ukraine supposedly did not need this system or that. It was widely said by the analytical community at the time (as it was said about Patriots, ATACMS, etc) that F-16s would not be “game changers”, that Ukraine would never be able to use them properly, that training Ukrainian pilots would take too long, etc. Just one example, the Russian-sympathetic Responsible Statecraft think tank in 2023 combined many of these arguments in one steaming pile of crap piece—downplaying the importance of Ukraine getting F-16s. Btw, there were many others making similar arguments. I have them all.

At the time, Edward Stringer and I in The Atlantic argued that all these arguments were deeply flawed, not least because people were underestimating the crucial role the F-16 could play in Ukrainian air defense—gift link attached.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/05/ukraine-military-f-1
6-aircraft/674022/?gift=BQHDq1p24LRO8cUUEyLQ65GAm3aCTeE_LA-BH67rPbw&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share

Having F-16s would broaden Ukraine’s ability to shoot down incoming Russian missiles and drones. During last year’s campaigns, the Russians relied on a wide range of attack platforms: relatively simple and inexpensive Iranian Shahed drones, repurposed S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, more advanced Kalibr cruise missiles, and even Russia’s latest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. To shoot down just some of this weapony, the Ukrainians had to rely overwhelmingly on ground-based anti-air systems—to such a degree that rumors spread that Ukraine was or would soon be running short. Without an airborne defense—something F-16s would help provide—Ukraine is, to use a sports metaphor, defending on its own goal line. Instead of a systematic defense of its skies, the Ukrainians are fending off attacks on targeted infrastructure point by point. Any defense that relies on last-ditch saves is a notably poor one.

And here we are—more than 2 years later and Ukraine might not be able to defend its skies without F-16s. The next time an analyst assures you a certain weapon won't be a game changer, or that Ukraine will not need them, can’t use them, can’t operate them, etc—tell them to jump off a cliff.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.

Thanks for reading Phillips’s Newsletter! This post is public so feel free to share it.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Sunday, October 12, 2025 11:10 AM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

There's only so much bullshit I care to wade thru, so I'm surprised O'Brien can write so much crap. Doesn't he find it fatiguing?

Quote:
Oddly, they had some real successes attacking power generation during the winter of 2023-2024, though last winter the attacks did not seem so effective. It might have been that the Biden Administration helped Ukraine prepare its air defense better for last winter and for most of the time Ukrainians had access to power and heat.

Maybe its bc Russia ramped up drone and missile production, and regularly attacks with 500 drones and dozens of missiles. Since you have to fire at least two air defense interceptors per target, Ukraine simply doesn't have the tens of thousands they would need to defend against such dense attacks... AND NEITHER DOES THE USA OR THE EU. AND WE CAN'T BUILD THEM FAST ENOUGH.

Once again proving that for air war, it's far easier to attack than defend.
So pfffft!. There goes his tortured "explanation" of "Ukraine air defenses are failing bc Trump loves Putin".

Quote:
One of the reasons I’ve been so impressed with how Ukraine has waged its war, is that it has tried not to commit the kinds of war crimes that Russia commits against it multiple times a day. The Russians regularly attack Ukrainian civilians in hospitals, nurseries and, of course, their homes.

Yanno, on the one hand, SECOND, you posted a video bragging that Ukrainian drone control centers are stationed in ordinary homes to prevent detection, and then post an article claiming that Russians attack hospitals, nurseries, and homes.

Russians don't attack civilian structures being used by civilians. They DO attack civilian structures with military targets inside. I've watched hundreds of drone and bomb attacks on houses, barns, and those heavy Soviet-built apartments buildings... by both sides, BTW... bc they housed "temporary deployments" and storage for the opposing side's miltary. Since neither side wants to waste their drones (artillery shells, bombs, missiles) these sites are confirmed by drone surveillance detecting vehicles and soldiers clustered around a building.

What?
You really expected both sides to fight in open fields, marching towards each other in neat rows while firing muskets?

The Russian plan seems to be to depopulate Ukraine as much as possible, creating a mass exodus to far western Ukraine and EU nations, clearing the battlefield to save civilian lives and to eliminate the food, water, shelter, and support that Ukraine's army has been extracting from locals. Also, Ukrainian trains run on electricity, not with diesel locomotives, so there's that.

Is attacking civilian infrastructure a war crime? Yes, I suppose it is. But it's not an attack on civilians per se, and other civilian infrastructure like water treatment plants are left alone.

F-16s are limited by # of trained pilots.

Ukrainians really have no response that will change the course of the war. All they can do is "punish" Russia by attacking refineries, civilians, and the occasional military/ military industrial target, and assassinating (or attempting to assassinate) leaders and public figures.

-----------
"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Monday, October 13, 2025 5:53 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Seven EU states increased Russian energy imports in 2025

October 10, 2025 7:57 pm

https://kyivindependent.com/seven-eu-states-increase-russian-energy-im
ports-in-2025-reuters-reports/

France saw a 40% year-on-year jump, importing 2.2 billion euros ($2.5 billion), while the Netherlands' imports surged 72% to 498 million euros ($579 million).

Belgium, Croatia, Romania, and Portugal also raised their imports. Hungary recorded an 11% year-on-year increase.

Hungary and Slovakia have remained major recipients of Russian oil and gas, accounting for some 5 billion euros ($5.8 billion) of the bloc's energy bill.

An EU-Russia specialist at the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) described the upward flows as "a form of self-sabotage," noting that Russia's energy revenues remain its largest funding source in the war.

Trump urged European nations to "immediately cease all energy purchases from Russia," calling the continued imports "inexcusable" and accusing NATO allies of funding the very war they are opposing.

"Europe has to step it up. They can't be doing what they're doing. They're buying oil and gas from Russia while they're fighting Russia," Trump said.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, October 13, 2025 5:55 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Russia’s effort to generate increased military recruitment through high financial incentives is reportedly losing momentum, indicating that Russia’s main method for recruiting volunteers for its war may be hitting diminishing returns.

Independent Russian-language outlet Idel Realii reported on October 12 that employees in Russian military recruitment offices stated that the number of people signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is not increasing even in regions offering the highest financial incentives.[12] The sources reportedly assessed that everyone who wanted to “make money from the war” had already signed up. Idel Realii noted that Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is currently offering the highest one-time signup bonus with 3.2 million rubles (about $39,300) and that regional payouts across Russia increase on average by 500,000 rubles (about $6,100) every three to four months. Idel Realii reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast’s March 2025 decision to increase its one-time payout to 3.1 million rubles (about $38,100) did not result in an influx of new recruits. Military recruitment employees in two unspecified Siberian regions reported that only recruits of “extremely advanced age” and with chronic illnesses have been signing up recently. Idel Realii reported that sources in a city in northern Irkutsk Oblast stated that there have been issues with recruitment for several months and that recruits are mostly asking questions about the financial payouts and benefits for servicemembers, such as priority education for their children, loan deferments, and debt forgiveness — demonstrating how those who are signing up are only financially motivated. A source from Irkutsk Oblast stated that the Russian MoD has been trying to recruit people with advertisements — particularly in the lead up to the US-Russia summit in Alaska on August 15 — claiming that a settlement to the war is coming soon, so recruits should “get [their] millions before peace comes.” The source also noted that the Russian MoD is deceiving people by advertising how much recruits could make in one year, given the monthly salaries for servicemembers operating in the combat zone, even though Russian authorities are often sending new recruits not to the rear but on assault missions at the front, where the life expectancy is often less than one year.

ISW assessed in February 2025 that ever-greater financial incentives for new recruits in the future are unlikely to dramatically increase recruitment, as a large portion of the pool of Russian citizens who are incentivized by money at levels the Russian state could afford to offer at scale have likely already volunteered to join the military.[13] The growing financial incentives for new recruits and social benefits for servicemembers suggest that sign up rates have been declining and that Russia has had to find new incentives to drive recruitment.[14] ISW continues to assess that decreases in Russian recruitment, such that Russia cannot replace its high casualty rates, could in part force Russian President Vladimir Putin to choose between conducting an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Putin has shown great reluctance to order, or coming to the negotiating table to end the war.[15]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive
-campaign-assessment-october-12-2025/

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, October 13, 2025 9:22 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Why Putin and Russia May Be Running Out of Time in Ukraine

By Benjamin Hart | Oct 13, 2025

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/why-putin-and-russia-may-be-ru
nning-out-of-time-in-ukraine.html

More than three and a half years into the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia is pummeling Ukrainian cities from the air with ever more force, while retaining an advantage on the battlefield in the east — though it is far from achieving a significant breakthrough. Ukraine has found success striking Russian oil refineries deep in the country and may receive longer-range missiles from the Trump administration, which has been more focused on negotiating peace in Gaza after a summit with Putin in Alaska failed to yield results. Meanwhile, Russian drones and aircrafts have made appearances over multiple NATO countries, putting Europe on edge as the continent contemplates a broader defense strategy to combat its neighbor to the east.

These developments may not seem seismic on their face, but Nigel Gould-Davies thinks they signal a major shift. Gould-Davies, a Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies who has served as the U.K. ambassador to Belarus, wrote recently that foreign-policy setbacks and economic challenges have put Russia in a bind, which “compels it to accelerate its theory of victory – to grind down Ukraine militarily and outlast the West politically – before the window for winning closes forever.”
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/10/the-russi
aukraine-war-has-entered-a-new-phase/

I spoke with him about why he believes the West has a major advantage against Putin going forward.

You argue that “Time may no longer be on Russia’s side.” You elaborate in your article, but for readers — why do you think that? What is different about this moment than any point since the war began in 2022?
I would look first at the new things that are happening and work backwards to the underlying conditions that are impelling Russia to behave this way. What we observe is this sudden and very striking escalation of drone and even fighter incursions. These things aren’t entirely new — what’s entirely new is the scale of them. The second thing that’s going on is this sudden intensification of drone and missile attacks on major cities and in particular, energy infrastructure. Again, not entirely new, but the scale of it is absolutely unprecedented. So what might be causing this? That’s what led me to think in the round about Russia’s condition. And it’s partly inferential, but partly a matter of looking at some of the hints — actual specific evidence that elites now are more worried and anxious than they’ve been at any time since the war began.

First there are the external conditions that Russia faces as a consequence of policy choices and decisions made by the other major actors beyond its immediate, combatant adversary, which is Ukraine. All of last year, Putin was waiting for Trump to return. Russia was very happy with the November election result, and was looking forward to engaging with Trump, hoping that he would bring about a fundamental shift in American policy, hoping for the far end of expectations — that America might abandon Ukraine, might potentially even abandon Europe, and would ease or lift sanctions against Russia.

Russia worked hard to try to exploit what it saw as the opportunity of the new Trump administration. But what we’ve seen in practice is that as the dust is settling on nine months of turbulent diplomacy, America has ultimately disappointed Putin’s hopes and ambition. And we’ve heard very explicit confirmation of this by Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov, who said that the spirit of the Alaska Summit has now dissipated.

Although Putin and Trump are still praising each other.
But if one looks at Trump’s deeds rather than his words — there were one or two very difficult specific moments, and we all remember the awful Oval Office meeting with Zelensky on February 20, and the temporary halting of intelligence support to Ukraine. But we’re now in a situation where that relationship with Zelensky appears to have been restored, where the United States is still providing important forms of intelligence help and is still providing weapons, albeit now selling them rather than giving them to Ukraine. And to round out the diplomatic piece, we saw very warm engagement between Trump and European leaders at the Hague NATO Summit in June. And that shifts us off onto the second part of the story, which is Europe stepping up now.

I would say the most important consequence of that NATO summit was the commitment of almost all members — Spain is a partial exception — to spending five percent of GDP on defense by 2035. Since Europe’s GDP is so much greater than Russia’s, the consequences of that are very significant. Roughly speaking, Europe’s collective GDP — I’m including the UK in this, of course — is around 10.6 times greater than Russia’s. That is a margin of superiority in raw economic strength over Russia that is greater than the margin of superiority that the whole of the transatlantic alliance enjoyed over the whole of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. If you just look at the raw numbers, Europe’s margin of superiority is over three times what it was during the Cold War. That’s very significant.

Pull the camera back further for a moment. There’s a strong case for saying that the iron law of history regarding major great power conflicts, where vital interests are at stake, is that ultimately wars are won by the richer side. And that makes sense. In a war of fundamental interest, you mobilize everything you have for victory, because the stakes are so high. The more stuff you have, the more weapons of war you can make. The more ploughshares you have, the more swords you can fashion them into. If you had to summarize the great book by Paul Kennedy that charts this, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers — if you had to summarize that in one sentence, it would be that in major power wars, the richer side wins. If you put the situation we face now in that larger historical and analytical context, the implications are very clear that if Europe continues to see this as a conflict involving its vital interests, something it cannot afford to lose, it has material capacity to outcompete and ultimately outfight Russia. There are various caveats one can make to that, and one of them is the nuclear one, that Europe has no medium or shorter range nuclear weapons, and only a few French and British strategic nuclear weapons, whereas Russia has thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

That does seem important, yes.
There’s also coordination, and making sure that the logistics of national states work properly and so on. You can talk about those things. But if you’re sitting in the Kremlin and looking at the numbers in a clear-eyed way, what you see is this slow tsunami approaching, of massive increases in European defense spending. Again, look at the underlying numbers here. Let’s suppose Europe doesn’t reach that five percent figure. Let’s say it just gets to three percent. Since Europe’s GDP is 10 times greater than Russia’s, it follows from that, arithmetically, that Russia would have to spend 30 percent of its GDP just to keep up. That’s astonishing. It’s vastly more than the around 7.5 percent that it’s spending now, and much more than the Soviet Union was spending during the Cold Wars, which was around 15 to 20 percent of GDP. And that was a hell of a burden. This is a completely different game. And to compound that, look at the woes and difficulties that are increasingly besetting Russia’s economy. As I put it in that piece, it’s like two blades of a pair of scissors cutting into the economy.

And finally, the China bit. On one hand, China is providing very significant forms of economic help. But what Russia really needs now is not just, perhaps not even primarily, the inputs of military, technological stuff that China is selling. It needs the finances to pay for that, and to keep the Russian economy afloat more generally. China is not supplying that. It might eventually, but as things stand now, the next few years, things are all going in the wrong direction as far as Russia is concerned.

Connect that total situation back to what I began with: this series of trends increasingly and quite quickly moving against Russia explains why Russia understands that it’s faced with a closing window of opportunity, and therefore must escalate its attacks and escalate the risks, partly against Ukraine, but particularly against Europe. The balance of resources vastly favors Europe. Russia’s only way of effectively combating that is to try to tilt the balance of resolve in favor of itself by presenting such threats and risks that Europe is divided and deterred from doing what it has embarked on doing.

Putin was bombing Ukraine very intensely even while Trump was much friendlier to him in the early months of this administration. You’re saying that this escalation is happening because Putin feels cornered, but why would he have been so aggressive before, when he presumably didn’t feel so cornered?
I do think that in the last couple of weeks, we’ve seen a step change in the severity, intensity, of those attacks, unmatched up until now. You are right, he’s been bombing Kyiv regularly for a long, long time, and things did begin to become worse back then. It’s very striking that Russia at no point even hinted at a willingness to accommodate or compromise. There was a kind of brazenness, even during negotiations in Istanbul and the Middle East.

And before and after the Alaska summit.
Yeah, that’s right. It’s hard to infer really exactly what was going on in the Kremlin mind. There’s almost a sense Russia is showing that it’s not going to compromise even as it’s seeking concessions from the United States. It’s not the rational thing to do. Obviously, if you are trying to at least posture as a reasonable country pretending to seek peace, and to portray your adversary as, as the one that doesn’t all — all I can say is it feels very Russian, without being rational in a way that we would understand.

Over the last three years, I have heard a few times that the economic picture was darkening in Russia and that sanctions were really starting to bite. I’m sure you could find instances of Russian elites sounding dire during that time. But the economy has defied people’s expectations, given the intensity of the sanctions and everything else. It may not be booming, but it hasn’t collapsed. So why are you confident that this time is different?
Let me step back a moment and look at some of the language that you were sort of drawing upon. You say the economy hasn’t collapsed. That’s absolutely right. But that’s not the kind of test that it’s fair to set for sanctions, or even the combination of sanctions and war. Economies almost never collapse, under any circumstances.

Well, I guess I meant it hasn’t suffered a severe recession. There hasn’t been chaos in the streets.
I appreciate that, but one hears this word used quite a lot — that the economy hasn’t collapsed, and therefore sanctions aren’t working. And it’s a straw man. Smaller economies than Russia’s have been subject to such severe sanctions for longer. They don’t implode. And I think the reason people use this term, in particular in the context of Russia, is we have these memories of 1991, where things really did collapse. But that was a unique historical moment, which was a consequence of circumstances that will never recur, including an economic system that was historically out of time.

But why haven’t we had a severe recession? There’ve been two significant sources of growth since this combination of major war and major sanctions began. The first major source of growth was a huge external surplus. So Russia’s balance of payments shot up. That happened from mid 2022 onwards, and it happened for two reasons. One was that energy prices went up, and the second was that sanctions suppressed imports. Sanctions did genuinely shock the Russian economy before it began to find ways to get around many of the export controls. But there was a period where the combination of more revenues for Russian oil, plus fewer hard currency outflows — because imports fell drastically — created this huge external surplus, and that buoyed the Russian economy. And then imports did gradually rise again, and energy prices began to fall.

The second big source of growth, which arrived in early 2023, was this huge increase in military spending. And for a while that sustained things. It’s worth looking at the experience of other countries. Major wars are typically economic stimulants. The really interesting thing in that comparative perspective is how short-lived the Russia boom has been — not that it happened, but that it is withering away manifestly. It’s not only that the Russian economy is virtually stagnant now, but that if you look within the economy, the non- militarized sector has stopped growing, and there’s a massive, ongoing transfer of resources to military industrial production, and huge payments needed by the Russian state to persuade its citizens to fight.

This is a point of fundamental significance: that Russia is doing everything it possibly can not to compel its citizens to fight. It’s exhorted them to fight, and in particular, it’s paying them to fight. It’s using North Korean soldiers, Cuban soldiers, militaries from other parts of the world. But it is avoiding doing what is always done before, which is drawing upon either a large peasant serf army or a mass Soviet conscription system to fight. And that’s very expensive. Russia has to pay its soldiers as well as pay for materiel production for the war.

I could go on about some of the other distortions and problems that the Russian economy and financial system faces. To return to the core of your question, a series of phenomena now are converging in Russia’s political economy that we absolutely have not seen before: the highest real interest rates in the world; the fact that major non-military enterprises now are starting to shed labor, moving to four day weeks; the fact that in some regions now pensioners, in order to combat inflation, are starting to be given a kind of ration card. They’re avoiding calling it a ration card, but that’s what it is. And so on. There really is a palpable sense that elites are worried again to a degree that we haven’t seen since the beginning of the war, and that there are quite specific, quiet, discussions about escape routes, about the prospect of collapse and so on. The best economic minds in Russia are the most worried about this situation.

To go back a bit: you said the richer side always wins great power conflicts. First of all, is this a great power conflict? It may have more in common with a proxy fight of the Cold War. And the richer side of those conflicts didn’t always win — I’m thinking of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Sometimes it’s the side that’s more committed, and Russia has shown that it is committed to this fight. Europe may be upping its defense spending by the day, but it’s not so simple as a financial equation.

There are some very significant recent examples of small countries defeating great powers, whether it’s Vietnam, whether it’s the Soviet Union against Afghanistan, the U.S. in Afghanistan. What are all those situations? Those are big powers against small powers, where I think one can say that the balance of resolve more than offset the balance of resources. The North Vietnamese were absolutely committed. They put themselves through extraordinary sacrifices. America ultimately concluded that defending South Vietnam was not a vital interest. It had vast resources, but they were limited, and they were needed for more important things in other parts of the world. So a determined small power can beat an uncommitted large power, if the large power concludes that its vital interests are not at stake, and it couldn’t afford to lose without its security fundamentally being compromised. And I think that was why, in all of these cases, the much larger power ultimately withdrew and was defeated. They didn’t have to win. The costs of continuing the war were greater than the costs of leaving the war.

So is Europe to Ukraine as America was to Vietnam, or as the Soviet Union was to Afghanistan? Absolutely not. They are fundamentally different strategic situations, because everyone understands that this war that Russia is fighting is not only about Ukraine, and that Russia, if it’s victorious in Ukraine, will simply be in a better position to pose a larger and longer term threat to continental security. Russia set out its vision for the architecture of a future European security order in two treaties that were presented in December of 2021. They envisaged a United States essentially withdrawn from Europe, and a NATO rolled back to its 1990 borders. It would’ve been very, very easy at any point for Russia to have said “We have no quarrel with Europe.” You can imagine the sort of language they’d use. It would be dishonest, but they could have used it. “We have special historical interest commitments to Ukraine as a special historical part of the Rus, blah blah blah.” A lot of European audiences would’ve been very happy to believe that. At no point has Russia even hinted at that.

Well, Putin has claimed that he wasn’t going to invade Europe.
I haven’t seen that, or certainly not any version of it, that anyone would take seriously. What are the drones doing? What are the fighters doing if he’s not posing a threat to Europe? What about the sabotage actions? What about the attempted assassination of the CEO of Rheinmetall? It came very close, that plot. There’s all sorts of things everyone can point to. I don’t see any significant constituency of European opinion that thinks that Russia is not a threat. So again, it’s not like Afghanistan, not like Vietnam and so on. What Russia has to do now in this closing window of opportunity is tilt the balance of resolve, and deter and divide and intimidate. So that’s really what Putin is doing. He’s not trying to, as it were, neuter Europe by reassurance. He’s neutering it by threat, by the prospects of escalation and trying to exploit the fear of escalation.

To your other point, about the practical problems Europe faces in turning its much bigger reservoir of economic stuff into deployable force: If you think of it as a reservoir, this big kind of lump of stuff underground — it gets to the surface through a very narrow pipe of finances called the defense budget. The problem there is that almost every European country’s finances are very strained, much more strained than during the Cold War, where we are all spending a significantly higher proportion than we are now of our GDP on defense. Today our societies are aging and ailing, and you have this massively greater sort of welfare spending, massively greater debt to GDP ratios, much less headroom for increasing defense spending.

Here Putin has one advantage. Change the metaphor: The pie that he has of GDP is much smaller, but he can devote a much bigger slice of it to defense, because one of the consistent themes of the whole Putin presidency has been fierce fiscal conservatism. This is a very clear lesson looking both at the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also perhaps even more, the humiliation of the default of 1998. He’s been absolutely determined to put Russian public finances on a sound footing. And that means a much smaller debt-to-GDP ratio and a much lower budget deficit. It also helps to have a repressive political system, not especially responsible to popular demand, so you can impose forced choices on the allocation of resources.

Right, no dealing with pesky elections or protests.
All of that means that yes, they have a smaller pie but that they can devote a much bigger slice to the war. Even that, though, is beginning to become more difficult. Russia cannot borrow abroad now. It needs to spend more. So what are its options? It can borrow more domestically — it’s doing that. And it can raise taxes — it’s doing that as well. It’s also been drawing down the National Welfare fund, which was set up in the 2000s to salt away oil revenues for a rainy day. That’s now been falling very significantly.

If Putin is sending drones into the airspaces of various European countries, what is the best-case scenario for him there? You say he wants to divide Europe, but what would that look like? Would it be scaring European leaders into saying “let’s cut a deal favorable to Putin on his terms to wrap things up in Ukraine?”
It’s a very good question. I think he’s hoping that some of the larger, more Western European states will be intimidated by the prospect of escalation. I don’t see that happening.

It doesn’t seem like a great strategy.
And there’s a sense in which the fact that it’s not great suggests that there’s a degree of desperation to it. I’ll draw another comparison. It’s well known that Russia has been conducting a very active campaign of sabotage across Europe. We cannot be sure that all the incidents that are suspected of being Russia-caused in fact originate from Russia, but an awful lot do. And they have been attributed publicly by multiple security services in many countries. This was something that never happened during the Cold War in Europe. We know that the Soviet Union had extensive plans to carry out sabotage and assassinations on our territories should war break out to disrupt us as part of a full-fledged military campaign. Those preparations had been made, but they weren’t implemented, because war never did break out. The very few cases of assassinations of individuals were almost all of Soviet dissidents and exiles rather than European citizens.

And yet we have a situation now where in this kind of drip, drip, drip way, Russia is carrying out attacks, including on critical infrastructure, on cables, pipelines, train systems, those sorts of things. And it’s very odd if you think about it, because what it does is it highlights the threat that Russia poses and also gives us the opportunity to improve our resilience against future ones because we are sensitized to the risk. It’s not storing all this stuff up to do in the event that a war breaks out. It’s showing us what it can do ahead of time. And I’m not actually not sure that the Kremlin has really thought that through.

So what do you think happens next? To give you an easy one.
Well, now we’re in punditry territory.

Yes, sorry about that,
No, that’s okay — it has to be done. At a minimum, I’ll say quite confidently that Russian probing and testing of our tolerance for its incursions will not just continue, but escalate until such time as we demonstrate, unassailably with deeds, not just words, that we will not tolerate this.

What kind of deeds?
Well, that means stopping things happening.

Risky territory, obviously.
Risky for whom? That’s the question we’re asking. Inevitably people go back to what Turkey did back in 2015. A Russian plane was in Turkish airspace for 17 seconds and boom, it got shot down. Never happened again. Put it this way: if the only way to stop stuff getting into your airspace is to shoot it down, then that’s what you have to do. Otherwise, it becomes a slow, steady invasion of your airspace. What do you do with invasions? You stop them.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, October 13, 2025 9:50 AM

THG

Keep it real please

Russia has been, in the beginning of its end. Their collapse is imminent. If Trump wasn't a moron, it would have happened.

T

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