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Perhaps the only thing more remarkable than the joint U.S.-Israeli decapitation strike against the Iranian regime on February 28 is the nature of the criticism of the action. Nearly all opponents claim support for the demise of the bloody-handed Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while simultaneously expressing outrage that the operation itself has supposedly violated a litany of laws, norms and other requirements that were necessary to proceed.

The most prominent objections are that President Donald Trump acted without first explaining his objectives; that he failed to secure Congressional authorization or the support of America’s international allies; and that he refused to exhaust diplomacy before choosing military options.

Aggressively questioning the use of military force by any government is healthy and, in a democracy, necessary. And there are always legitimate concerns about the course of any military conflict. But when opposition is more about obfuscating than informing, the process of deliberation and debate becomes tainted by unnecessary partisanship. Indeed, the thinness of the core objections to the Iran operation indicates that the Trump administration is on rather firm ground.

First, the primary objectives of the operation are obvious and reasonable. For nearly 50 years, the Iranian regime has been at war against America and its interests in the region, and over the past decade it had been escalating dramatically. Not only was Tehran moving ahead full steam toward a nuclear weapons capability, it radically increased its support for terror proxies in the region, culminating with the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led massacre in Israel. Even after its nuclear and ballistic missile programs were severely degraded by U.S. and Israeli strikes in June, the regime remained intent on rebuilding all of its bases of power including its nuclear capabilities.

Repeated criticism that the Trump administration hasn’t yet offered a specific “endgame” for the operation misses the point entirely—the only requirement is an Iran no longer able to threaten the region, or beyond. The type of regime that next governs, for example, is of lesser concern.

Second, the notion that the action is “unconstitutional” or “unlawful” betrays a misunderstanding of both the Constitution and historic practice. The original text of the Constitution granted Congress sole power “to make war,” but the final draft replaced "make" with "declare," recognizing the unique prerogatives of the president (“commander-in-chief”) on national security. Ever since Thomas Jefferson waged “undeclared” war against North African pirates in the Mediterranean, all presidents have claimed such authority. And while the 1973 War Powers Act tried to curb its excesses, the Trump administration met the letter of that law by informing Congressional leaders prior to the strike, and now has 60 days to garner formal approvals.

Third, America’s international allies were by no means neglected. The initial military operation aimed at taking out Khamenei and his inner circle, if it was to have any chance of success, required extreme secrecy. Select allies in the region were notified in advance, and many more, including NATO members, are now offering support for the longer-term mission of ensuring the Iranian regime remains defanged. Attempting to form an international coalition in advance—while the regime in Tehran prepared for war—would have been impractical and unwise.

Finally, the charge that the Trump administration ignored the possibility that diplomacy could achieve better outcomes than military action belies reality. White House envoys made several attempts at “coercive diplomacy,” but the barriers between the two sides—mostly centered on eliminating Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats—were all but unbreachable. This should come as no surprise: The last time comprehensive diplomacy was attempted, in the form of the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear agreement, Iran refused to give up its ability to enrich uranium all the way up to bomb-grade, curtail its ballistic missile programs or reduce support for its regional terror proxies. Diplomacy with this regime had been a dead end for decades.

It is certainly understandable that critics and concerned citizens alike would worry that the Iran mission could lead to another “endless war” in the Middle East. But this was not a specific “regime change” operation requiring a direct U.S. long-term commitment. It was a rare opportunity to eliminate a decades-old security threat to the region and the world, and offer the possibility of a better future for the Iranian people. We can all join in wishing for its success.

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Originally posted by SIGNYM:
In other words, the war ends when IRAN ends it

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